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Abstract: There is a growing interest in an emerging phenomenon, CEO activism, in 
which a firm’s CEO communicates his or her stand on social-political issues. Researchers 
have examined the effect of CEO activism on public opinion, customers’ attitudes, 
purchase decisions, and employee’s relationship with external stakeholders. Scholars 
argue that CEO activism is distinct from nonmarket strategy components—Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA). Prior research does 
not address how CEO activism is distinct from CSR and CPA and how they relate to each 
other. CPA involves the firm’s activities, mainly lobbying and Political Action 
Committee (PAC) contributions, intended to shape governmental policy favorable to the 
firm. I draw on upper echelons theory as well as research on CPA and CSR to examine 
the effect of CEO activism, as measured by the number of non-business organizations 
with which the CEO is affiliated, on the firm’s CSR (as rated by MSCI) and CPA (dollar 
amount spent on lobbying and PACs) as well as the downstream effect on the firm’s sales 
growth. I theorize an interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO’s political 
ideology, as measured by an index of CEO’s political contributions ten years prior to 
their tenure (liberalism index), on the firm’s CSR and CPA. Further, I predict a positive 
association between sales growth and both CSR and CPA. I use a lagged design with 
CSR and CPA measured two years after CEO’s appointment and sales growth, three 
years after the CEOs start. My sample includes CEOs of S&P’s 1500 companies who 
were appointed in the time window 2001 to 2011. Using 3-stage least square (3SLS) 
estimation method, I find that the interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO 
political ideology to be positively related to the firm’s CPA spending with a stronger 
association between CEO activism and firm’s CPA for liberal CEOs. Contrary to my 
hypotheses, I find a negative relationship between CPA and sales growth. The data does 
not substantiate the hypothesized interaction effect on CSR. However, I do find a positive 
relationship between CSR and sales growth.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a growing interest in an emerging phenomenon, CEO activism, in which a 
firm’s CEO communicates his or her stand on debated social-political issues, not directly 
related to the firm’s core business. It appears that CEOs speak out on a wide range and broad 
social issues including abortion, immigration, environmental policies, race relations, etc. 
Recent series of ongoing research by Weber Shandwick1, a public relations firm, in 
collaboration with KRC research, has provided thought-provoking insights into this 
phenomenon. Their surveys and polls have shown that the majority of customers expect the 
CEOs to take a stance when their company’s values are infringed (Weber Shandwick 2018). 
Also, nearly half of Americans believe that CEO activism influences governmental policy. 
The perceived influence seems to have risen and is consistent between Democrats and 
Republicans (2018). Research has also shown that CEO activism is positively related to 
purchase decisions with 50% of the customers reporting that they are more likely to
                                               
1 https://www.webershandwick.com/ 
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purchase from a company with a CEO whose stance on issues are consistent with the ones 
held by the customer (Weber Shandwick 2016). It appears that companies are also allocating 
more time to CEO activism. Marketing executives have reported that they discuss whether 
their CEO should take a stand and that there has been a significant increase in the time they 
spend discussing the matter. Marketers also report that CEO activism has a positive long-
term effect on the company’s reputation (WeberShandwick 2019). 
Statement of the problem. Previous work has examined the effect of CEO activism on 
public opinion (Chatterji and Toffel 2017), customers’ attitude toward the company         
(Chatterji and Toffel 2019), purchase decisions (Chatterji and Toffel 2017; Dodd and Supa 
2015; Korschun et al. 2016; WeberShandwick 2016), and employee’s relationship with 
external stakeholders (Korschun et al. 2017). Specifically, researchers have found that CEO 
activism positively influences public opinion of issues as well as customers’ purchase 
intentions, particularly among those who share the same viewpoint. The limited empirical 
research on CEO activism seems to indicate two differing perspectives on this phenomenon. 
Some researchers argue that CEO activism is distinct from nonmarket strategy components—
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA). For example, 
Chatterji and Toffel (2018) argue that unlike CPA, CEO activism is “transparent” and 
“highly visible”, therefore essentially a counterpoint to CPA. Also, CEO activism differs 
from strategic CSR in a sense that it addresses much broader social issues and unlike 
strategic CSR is not visibly profit-motivated. Another perspective contends that CEO 
activism is part of firm’s CSR (Clemensen 2017). 
Prior research does not address how CEO activism is distinct from CSR and CPA and 
how they relate to each other. Specifically, what is the relationship among CEO activism and 
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the two important elements of the nonmarket strategy: CSR and CPA. Exploring this issue is 
important because it helps us understand CEO activism outcomes for the firm and 
empirically test the implications of its unidentified boundary condition(s). The purpose of 
this dissertation is therefore to examine the implications of CEO activism for CSR and CPA. 
Drawing on upper echelons theory and related research on CPA and CSR, I hypothesize that 
CEO activism is positively related to CPA and CSR. In addition, I predict a diminishingly 
positive curvilinear relationship between CEO activism and CSR for liberal CEOs and no 
significant positive effect of CEO activism on CSR for conservatives. With regards to CPA, I 
predict a stronger relationship between CEO activism and CPA for liberal CEOs compared to 
conservative CEOs. Lastly, I hypothesize that firm CSR and CPA are both positively related 
to the firm’s sales growth. 
Method. I analyze CEO data of S&P 1500 companies. I study newly appointed CEOs 
who started between 2001 to 2011. This time window includes 3770 CEO-company pairs. 
After several steps of data cleaning and pre-processing I reach a sample of 293. I use a 
lagged design to examine the effect of CEO activism. As such, the CSR, CPA are measured 2 
years after the CEOs appointment and sales growth is gauged by the percentage change in the 
sales revenue three years after CEOs start. I measure CEO activism by the number of non-
business organizations to which the CEO is affiliated. The data for CEO activism is provided 
by BoardEx dataset, which provides detailed profiles of CEOs of virtually all U.S. public 
companies. I gauge CSR by the score assigned annually to each firm based on criteria 
determined by MSCI, a financial advisory firm. CPA is captured by the combined dollar 
amount of a firm’s spending on lobbying and PAC contributions. CPA data is sourced from 
Center for Responsible Politics. And finally, sales growth is measured by sales records of the 
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company provided by the Compustat database. I use 3-stage least square (3SLS) estimation 
method that allows simultaneous estimation of the parameter estimates. 
Findings. In this dissertation, I predict that all else equal, the relationship between 
CEO activism and firm’s CPA is will be stronger for liberal CEOs compared with the CPA of 
conservative CEOs. Consistent with this prediction, I find a significant interaction effect of 
CEO activism and CEO political ideology on the firm’s CPA, such that the association 
between CEO activism and CPA is stronger for liberals compared with conservative. I also 
find that higher CPA is negatively related to sales growth, an unexpected finding contrary to 
my hypothesis of a positive relationship between CPA and sales growth. These two findings 
combined seem to indicate that for liberal CEOs, activism is negatively related to sales 
growth through higher CPA. Moreover, consistent with past research, I find that CSR is 
positively related to sales growth. However, I do not find a significant interaction effect 
between CEO activism and CEO political ideology on the firm’s CSR. 
Contributions and implications. I draw on literature on nonmarket strategy as well as 
moral foundations theory (Graham et al. 2009) to theorize that CEO activism has important 
impacts on firm outcome including CSR, CPA, and sales growth. I also identify an important 
moderator of the relationship, CEO political ideology, and explain the implications of this 
boundary condition for my theory.  
In this dissertation, I contribute to the literature in several ways. First, I propose and 
empirically test a new theory, explaining and predicting the relationship among CEO 
activism, CEO political ideology, CSR, CPA, and sales growth. Therefore, I contribute to the 
depiction of the nomological network of CEO activism construct. Second, I provide some 
evidence into the conflicting perspectives on CEO activism: whether it is part of the firm’s 
 
 
5 
CSR and CPA or distinct and if it is distinct what the relationship among them is. I theorize 
and predict that CEO activism is an antecedent to CSR and CPA by predicting an interaction 
effect between CEO activism and CEO political ideology on firm’s CSR and CPA. I find 
some evidence for the interaction effect on CPA and ultimately the firm’s sales growth. 
However, the data I examined does not substantiate the effect of CEO activism on CSR. 
Third, I contribute to upper echelons theory with the main premise that executives inject their 
values into their strategic decisions. Little is known about how important firm outcomes 
including CSR, CPA, and sales growth are driven by CEO’s values. I provide evidence that 
CEO activism and CEO political ideology—a manifestation of CEOs values—work together 
to influence CPA and sales growth. 
Fourth, by identifying CEO activism as a driver of CPA, I contribute to strategy 
research. I introduce CEO activism as another predictor of CPA and examine CEO political 
ideology as the boundary condition affecting the relationship between CEO activism and 
CPA. Researchers had previously examined CPA predictors from different perspective 
including firm, industry, issue, and institutional perspectives. What remained missing from 
the literature was CPA drivers from CEO level. This dissertation addresses this gap by 
providing evidence that CEO activism predicts CPA. 
Lastly, I contribute to the emerging literature on CEO activism by adopting a novel 
measure of CEO activism. I capture CEO activism by the number of CEO affiliations to 
various non-business organizations using the BoardEx data. Considering all the limitations 
and scarcity of CEO statements on social-political issues, this proxy measure helps provide 
insights into research problems and paves the way for building a scientific foundation for this 
phenomenon.    
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Organization of the following chapters. The rest of this dissertation continues as 
follows. In Chapter II, I present a comprehensive review of the relevant literature from which 
I draw to theorize and test my theory. Specifically, I present literature on non-market strategy 
and its components, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity 
(CPA). In addition, I review literature on private politics, which includes activities from 
interest and activist groups to influence a firm’s non-market strategy. In Chapter III, I present 
the theoretical development, conceptual model, and the statement of hypotheses. In Chapter 
IV, I explain the research methodology, the sample and data sources, the variables used to 
test my theory, and the procedure to obtain those variables. In Chapter V, I summarize the 
results of the 3-stage least square (3SLS). Lastly in Chapter VI, I provide the discussion 
including the summary of the findings, contributions to theory and practice, limitations of the 
research, directions for future research, and conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The field of strategic management informs not just the market strategies that firms 
undertake to acquire economic profit, but also their nonmarket strategies targeted at the 
nonmarket environment to pursue the same goal. A successful business strategy 
comprises both market and nonmarket strategies (Baron 1995).  
In any given economy, there are formal and informal norms and regulations—also 
known as “rules of the game”— that construct market competition. The nonmarket 
environment consists of legal, social, and political arrangements by which firms’ 
interactions are organized among themselves as well as with the public (Baron 1995). 
The domain of nonmarket strategy centers around developing effective strategies to 
influence these institutions in a way that benefits the firm and secures it a competitive 
advantage (Baron and Diermeier 2007a). Traditionally nonmarket strategy is defined as 
“the coordinated actions firms undertake in public policy arenas” (Bonardi et al. 2006, p. 
1209). Nonmarket strategy relates to a firm’s set of actions aimed at improving its 
performance by influencing the institutional or societal environment (Mellahi et al. 
2016). Baron (1995) defines nonmarket strategy as “the concerted action of an interested 
party directed at a nonmarket issue that is a subject of competition in the cognizant 
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institutions where information typically plays an important role” (p. 75). To do so, firms 
need to understand the nonmarket forces—Government, interest groups, activists, and the 
public— that shape the nonmarket environment (Baron 1995). 
Nonmarket Strategy Drivers 
Bonardi et al. (2006) develop and examine a theory of the determinants of a 
firm’s nonmarket strategy. Building on political market framework, which views the 
political environment as a marketplace consisting of suppliers (i.e. firms and interest 
groups) and demanders (i.e. politicians, regulatory agencies, and courts) transacting over 
public policy, Bonardi et al. (2006) identify the antecedents of the firm’s success to 
influence public policy in its own favor. They find that the firm’s internal nonmarket 
capabilities and external environment (i.e. political market) significantly affect its 
achievement of favorable public policy. Bonardi et al. (2006) only focus on the 
regulatory dimension of the firm’s nonmarket strategy and were not able to examine 
multiple dimensions of firm’s nonmarket strategy such as grassroots mobilization, 
lobbying, and campaign contributions. 
In my review of the literature, I have identified two major streams of research 
within nonmarket strategy literature: corporate political strategy (a form of rent seeking) 
and strategic CSR. These two research streams seem to have evolved independently, 
drawn from disparate theoretical perspectives. However, recently researchers have 
attempted to integrate and bring these research streams under an overarching framework 
(Doh et al. 2012; Dorobantu et al. 2017; Mellahi et al. 2016). In the following, I will first 
explain and outline important research contributions to each stream in detail. Next, I will 
explain the studies that focus on integrating these two disparate research streams.  
 
 
9 
Figure 1 shows the scheme of my literature review on nonmarket strategy. 
Figure 1. Nonmarket Strategy Literature Review Schema 
Nonmarket strategy
Rent-seeking
Corporate Political 
Strategy
Corporate Political 
Activity
(CPA)
Lobbying
Political Action 
Committees
(PACs)
Corporate Social 
Responsibilty 
(CSR) 
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Rent-seeking 
The word “Rent” refers to “that part of the payment to an owner of resources over 
and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use”(Buchanan 
et al. 1980, p. 3). In other words, “Rent” includes “unearned income of any kind” (Morck 
and Yeung 2004, p. 391). Rent-seeking refers to “any redistributive activity that takes up 
resources” (Murphy et al. 1993, p. 409). The rent-seeking process involves a firm’s 
efforts to secure a competitive advantage through influence on legislative and regulatory 
processes rather than through market actions (Shaffer 1995). 
Government restrictions over economic activity in market-oriented economies 
engender rents and hence a competition for rents— that is rent-seeking (Krueger 1974). 
Rent seeking takes many forms and can be considered legal or illegal. In many 
economies, lobbying and political campaign contributions are viewed as legal processes 
of rent-seeking, whereas bribery, corruption, black markets, and smuggling are 
considered illegal processes of rent-seeking (Daskalopoulou 2016; Krueger 1974; 
Lambsdorff 2002).  
In the economics and finance literature, the term “political rent-seeking” has been 
defined as “self-interested dealings between the political and business elites” (Morck and 
Yeung 2004, p. 391). Lobbying politicians and swaying judicial process in one’s own 
favor are examples of political rent-seeking behavior (Murphy et al. 1993). Many 
economists agree that rent-seeking is detrimental to economic growth (Krueger 1974; 
Morck and Yeung 2004; Murphy et al. 1993; Murphy et al. 1991). 
Economists distinguish between private and public rent-seeking (Murphy et al. 
1993). Private rent-seeking involves transfer of resources between private parties and 
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takes the forms of theft, piracy, litigation, etc. An example is lawyers taking up litigation 
against big corporations. Public rent-seeking involves either redistribution from the 
private sector to the state (e.g., taxation) or from the private sector to government 
bureaucrats who influence the profits of the private sector (e.g., lobbying, corruption). 
In economic research, public rent-seeking has been shown to reduce economic 
growth by stifling innovative activity (Murphy et al. 1993). In the entrepreneurship 
literature, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that entrusting a country’s resources to a small 
economic and political elite group —“oligarchic family corporate group” (p. 405)—is 
associated with higher levels of political rent-seeking behavior and less economic growth.  
Therefore, based on the body of literature on rent-seeking, corporate political 
activities such as lobbying and political action committee (PAC) contributions are legal 
forms of rent-seeking in many market-oriented economies. In the next section, I will 
clearly define the concepts of corporate political strategy and corporate political activity 
and delineate their relationship.  
Corporate Political Strategy  
One important stream of research within the nonmarket strategy literature is 
corporate political strategy (Dorobantu et al. 2017; Mellahi et al. 2016). Corporate 
political strategy relates to a firm’s use of resources to undertake concerted actions to 
influence the political, social, and legal environment to gain a competitive advantage 
(Hillman and Hitt 1999a). Corporate political activity (CPA) is an important element of 
corporate political strategy and a body of literature has evolved around it. Corporate 
political activity refers to a firm’s deliberate attempts to influence public policy in a way 
that is favorable to the firm (Getz 1997; Hillman et al. 2004). Firm lobbying activities 
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and political action committee (PACs) contributions are the most commonly studied 
examples of corporate political activity (Hillman and Hitt 1999a; Lux et al. 2011; Ridge 
et al. 2017). Constituency building, advocacy advertising, and coalition building are 
among other types of corporate political strategies that are common to many firms (Keim 
and Zeithaml 1986).  
Before further reviewing the corporate political activity literature, it is important 
to draw a distinction between the terms: corporate political activity and corporate 
political strategy. Based on definitions of corporate political activity and corporate 
political ideology, these two concepts differ in two important ways. First, corporate 
political activity, unlike political strategy, is not necessarily tied to a firm’s business 
strategy. Second, corporate political activity is directed toward governmental policy or 
process, whereas political strategy is not limited to governmental policy and includes 
actions toward the social and legal environment as well (Getz 1997). Based on this, 
corporate political activity is viewed as a component of corporate political strategy. 
Nevertheless, these two terms have sometimes been used interchangeably in the 
literature.  
Corporate Political Activity  
CPA involves a firm’s activities to shape government policy in a way that benefits 
the firm (Hillman et al. 2004). Firm lobbying and PAC contributions are arguably the two 
most important means of CPA (Hillman et al. 2004; Lux et al. 2011). In fact, aggregated 
lobbying expenditures and PACs contributions are the most commonly used measures of 
corporate political activity (Hadani et al. 2015; Hadani and Schuler 2013; Lux 2016; Lux 
et al. 2011; Ridge et al. 2017). 
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Lobbying is a tactic used by a firm to influence government officials to make 
decisions that benefit the firm (Hillman and Hitt 1999a). Lobbying involves providing 
information to government officials with the aim of influencing their actions (Ridge et al. 
2017). Firms implement both internal and external lobbying. In internal lobbying firms 
use employee lobbyists and in external lobbying firms hire external lobbying 
professionals or lobbying firms to do the job. 
PAC contributions are another commonly used tactic utilized by firms to derive 
benefits. PAC contributions are viewed as a means to establish a quid pro quo 
relationship with political candidates (i.e. prospective government official). Firms 
develop PACs to increase a political candidate’s prospects of winning in an election in 
return for the candidate acting in the firm’s interest (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; 
Tahoun 2014). 
Based on published research and publicly available data, lobbying dominates the 
firm’s expenditures compared to PACs (Hill et al. 2013; Kerr et al. 2014; Milyo et al. 
2000) and is the primary and most effective means to influence government officials 
(Ridge et al. 2017). In my review of literature on corporate political activity, I identify 
three bodies of papers addressing three types of questions (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Key Research Questions Addressed within CPA Literature 
 
In one stream, scholars have attempted to address the question: how do firms 
utilize political activity?  To do so, they have attempted to explain the process of political 
strategy formulation (Hillman and Hitt 1999a; Oliver and Holzinger 2008). 
To address the question of how firms formulate Corporate Political Strategies, 
drawing on resource dependence and market exchange theories, Hillman and Hitt (1999a) 
developed a taxonomy of political strategies taken by the firms and introduced a 
decision-tree model that helps managers make political action strategic decisions. 
According to Hillman and Hitt (1999a) there are three important decisions 
involved in formulating political strategy: 1) the general approach to political strategy, 2) 
level of participation, and 3) the choice of political strategies. The first decision is the 
approach to political strategy. General approaches include transactional and relational. 
The transactional approach relates to formulating political strategies only when there is a 
relevant and salient issue to the firm. The relational approach refers to a firm’s 
What are the drivers 
of corporate political 
activity?
How do firms utilize 
corporate political 
activity?
What are the 
outcomes of corporate 
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involvement in the political arena over a long-term period rather than in response to a 
specific issue. The distinction between these two general approaches lies in their scope 
and length of transaction. 
The second decision involved is specification of the levels of participation: 
individual or collective. Individual participation involves taking up political actions as an 
individual firm as opposed collective involvement that involves cooperative actions with 
other firms. This distinction is analogous to distinction between competitive vs 
cooperative strategies in the market strategy literature. 
Finally, the last decision involved is the choice of specific strategies or tactics. 
Hillman and Hitt (1999a) provide three categories of political strategies: 1) informational, 
2) financial incentive, and 3) constituency-building. Information strategies involve 
providing policy makers with specific information regarding the issue outcomes in order 
to affect public policy. It includes tactics such as lobbying and funding research projects. 
Financial incentive strategies relate to attempts to influence policy makers by providing 
financial incentives. Examples of financial incentive tactics include contributions to 
political parties or politicians. Lastly, constituency-building strategies target constituents 
in attempt to influence public policy by gaining their support. It includes activities such 
as grassroots mobilization of employees or customers, advocacy advertising, and public 
relations. 
Drivers of CPA 
Another stream of published research has evolved addressing the following 
question: what are the drivers of corporate political activity? Several researchers have 
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investigated this question (Capron and Chatain 2008; Funk and Hirschman 2017; Hillman 
et al. 2004; Keim and Zeithaml 1986; Lux et al. 2011; Schuler et al. 2002; Shaffer 1995).  
Hillman et al. (2004), focused on papers published after Shaffer’s (1995) review 
paper. The authors integrated disparate literature and organized their effort in a model of 
antecedents, types, and outcomes of CPA. Specifically, in terms of antecedents they 
identify firm-, industry-, issue-, and institutional-level antecedents. Firm size and firm 
dependency on government are among the most prominent firm-level determinants of 
CPA. On the industry level, the industry structural characteristics (e.g., industry 
concentration) and the level of political activism within an industry are identified. With 
respect to issue charactersitics, issue salience has been shown as a key driver of CPA. 
And lastly, in terms of institutional differences, congressional characteristics, have been 
used in the explanation of CPA, predominantly PAC contributions. For example, Schuler 
et al. (2002) show that an industry represented by a congressional caucus is more likely to 
use multiple political activities.  
Schuler et al. (2002) contributed to the literature by investigating the drivers of 
firm engagement in multiple political tactics (i.e. PACs, inside lobbyists, and using 
outside lobbyists). They argue that “access” to politicians and legislators is necessary for 
businesses to gain influence in the public policy arena and that proactive firms combine 
political tactics to shape their business environments. The authors theorize five drivers of 
firms combining political tactics on two levels— industry and firm levels. One factor is 
industry concentration—that is the structural configuration of a target industry—with 
more concentrated a firm’s industry, the higher the likelihood of combining political 
tactics. Another factor is the industry having or lacking congressional caucus. The third is 
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political activism—that is how politically active other firms are in a given industry. The 
firm-level drivers include firm size and government contracts. Government contracts 
refer to the proportion of the firm’s total revenues drawn from contracts with the federal 
government. 
Using a meta-analysis of studies from different disciplines, Lux et al. (2011) 
examined the effect of traditionally proposed antecedents of CPA on firms engagement in 
CPA (measured through PACs and lobbying expenditures) at three different levels of 
analysis — institutional, industry, and firm levels. The institutional-level drivers include 
incumbent politicians (as opposed to first-time candidates), ideology (sympathetic to 
business interests), political competition, regulation, government sales (reliance of a 
firm’s revenues on government sales), and politician dependence on firms. The industry-
level drivers include industry concentration, international competition, and economic 
opportunity. Lastly, firm-level drivers include firm size and corporate strategy. The 
authors find that while these antecedents are significant drivers of CPA, incumbent 
politicians, government regulation, and firm size influence it to a greater extent.  
CPA and Firm Performance 
A body of research has evolved examining the outcomes of corporate political 
activity. Several researchers have examined this question (Bonardi et al. 2006; Hadani et 
al. 2015; Hadani and Schuler 2013; Hillman et al. 1999; Lux 2016; Lux et al. 2011; 
Ridge et al. 2017; Schuler et al. 2017). In this regard, a body of studies have developed 
around firm-specific benefits of political activities (Bonardi et al. 2006; Frynas et al. 
2006; Hillman et al. 1999). In the following, I will review published research on the 
relationship between CPA and firm performance. 
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Several researchers have shown a direct link between corporate political activity 
and performance (Frynas et al. 2006; Hillman et al. 1999; Lux 2016; Lux et al. 2011). 
Hillman et al. (1999) showed a positive association between one political strategy named 
personal service — that is having a firm representative serve in a political capacity — 
and firm value measured through stock market return. The authors ground their 
theorization in research on interlocking directories and cooptation—that is reducing 
uncertainty through developing relationships with entities that control or have access to 
resources that are critical to a firm. 
 Lux et al. (2011) in a meta-analysis found a positive link between corporate 
political activity as measured by firm’s total campaign contributions and lobbying 
expenditures, and firm economic performance captured by economic-based measures 
including return on assets (ROA) and return on investment (ROI). 
Lux (2016) shows that political strategic fit, which is the degree to which a firm’s 
actual political activities deviate from desired activity levels, operates as a dichotomous 
decision (engaging in CPA or freeriding) as opposed to an incremental one. Examining 
U.S. coal industry firms, the author finds that CPA is positively related to economic 
performance versus freeriding, which is negatively related to economic performance. 
Frynas et al. (2006) draw on resource based view (RBV), resource dependece 
theory (RDT), and reciprocity theory to examine the relationship between political 
resources and first mover advantage. Using case-study methodology, the authors identify 
the underpinnings of when political resources translate into first mover advantage (FMA) 
in international business. Factors related to government and the political business 
environment such as government interference in an industry, cooperation between a 
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firm’s home and host governments, and changes in the political business environment are 
shown to impact FMA. Moreover, factors related to the firm political and non-political 
resources are proposed to influence FMA. 
In a review of the literature on the association between nonmarket strategy and its 
performance outcomes, Mellahi et al. (2016) show inconsistency in the reported results of 
previous empirical studies, with the majority reporting a positive association and the 
minority reporting mixed, insignificant, and negative association between nonmarket 
strategy and corporate performance. To address this inconsistency the authors propose an 
integrative framework that identifies the key drivers, mediating, and moderating variables 
involved in this association. They categorize these factors as either internal or external. 
The mediating mechanisms concern the means and approaches of implementing the 
nonmarket strategy. The mediating mechanisms are classified as those that are related to 
organizational boundary spanning (the bridging and buffering mechanisms) and those 
that are related to internal strategy formulation (market and nonmarket strategies 
integration and complementarity of nonmarket strategies). The boundary spanning 
mechanisms include bridging and buffering mechanisms, which are not mutually 
exclusive. Bridging mechanisms involve activities adhering to social and political 
expectations of stakeholders. Such mechanisms have been researched from institutional 
theory, stakeholder theory, resource-based view theory (RBV), and resource dependence 
theory (RDT) perspectives. One example of a bridging mechanism for a multinational 
enterprise is aligning the firm’s nonmarket activities to local institutions to gain 
legitimacy, thereby improving firm economic performance. Buffering mechanisms 
involve activities aimed at influencing the external nonmarket environment. A firm uses 
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the buffering strategies to protect itself from the external environment. Examples include 
lobbying, rent-seeking, and campaign contributions. Scholars have drawn on RDT and 
RBV to look into these mechanisms.  
Internal mediating mechanisms involve integration of market and nonmarket 
strategies as well as complementarity of nonmarket strategies. Integration of two strategy 
components is focused on formulating an integrated strategy aligning both market and 
nonmarket activities. According to Mellahi et al. (2016), RBV is the dominant theoretical 
lens in this mechanism: acquiring firm-specific resources that help the firm to manage 
both market and nonmarket components with the aim of securing a competitive 
advantage. Complementarity of nonmarket strategies is related to the complementarity of 
CSR and CPA nonmarket strategies and the interaction of the two. 
Moderators of the Relationship Between CPA and Performance 
Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical foundation in the theorization of 
moderators in the relationship between CPA and firm performance (Mellahi et al. 2016). 
Mellahi et al. (2016) identify macro-environmental and institutional moderators, 
industry-level moderators, and organizational-level moderators as external moderating 
factors and intra-organizational moderators reflecting the degree of agency conflicts and 
managerial opportunism as the internal moderating mechanisms.   
Hadani et al. (2015) propose that one of the contextual factors impacting the 
relationship between corporate political activity (CPA) and firm performance is CEO 
discretion, which refers to CEO’s latitude of action. Corporate political activity refers to 
“any deliberate firm action intended to influence governmental policy or process.”(Getz 
1997). They show that CEO discretion moderates the relationship between CPA and firm 
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performance such that with higher levels of CEO discretion CPA is negatively associated 
with performance. However, this result is contingent on how performance is measured 
and which CEO discretion proxy is used to capture CEO discretion.   
Issue saliency — that is widespread support of an issue among a large segment of 
constituents — is known to reduce the effectiveness of a firm’s political strategies 
(Bonardi and Keim 2005). Information and reputation cascades, which are driven by 
activist or nongovernmental organizations, are two important factors that cause issues to 
become salient. Information cascades happen “when an individual, having observed the 
actions of others, chooses to follow others’ behavior, regardless of personal information 
possessed, because he or she thinks the others are more knowledgeable” (Bonardi and 
Keim 2005, p. 556). Reputation cascades “apply to individuals who are, or desire to be, 
specialists on a subject (e.g., experts or reporters). These individuals may follow the 
behavior of other specialists, potentially going against their private preference, not as a 
result of ignorance but rather to earn professional and social approval or to avoid 
professional and social disapproval” (Bonardi and Keim 2005, p. 556). The authors 
propose strategies for the firms to prevent salient issues and explain how firms can 
respond to widely salient issues.   
Market Actions as Means of Gaining Policy Advantage 
Research on corporate political activity has mostly focused on firm’s nonmarket 
actions to gain policy advantage. In a recent article Funk and Hirschman (2017) argued 
that firms influence the nonmarket environment, not just through nonmarket actions, but 
by market actions. Examples of such market actions include mergers and acquisitions, 
and relocating production. They conceptualize two pathways of change that firms might 
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affect. Formal policy change — alteration of formal rules — and interpretive policy 
change — that is change in the effect of the formal rules without transforming the 
codified rules. 
For a summary of the findings of all the papers reviewed on CPA see Table 1. In 
the next section, I will review papers on CPA framed with the resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm. 
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Table 1. Summary of the Literature on CPA 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CPA 
Measures 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Keim and 
Zeithaml 1986) 
Public choice (assumes 
legislators as self-interested 
agents); Exchange model 
(constituents provide political 
support in return for the 
legislator taking position on key 
issues advocated by voters)  
Firm and 
institution
al level 
NA NA NA Conceptual  Develop an exchange model of the 
legislative process in which corporations 
influence legislative decisions. Develop 
typology of legislative decisions based on 
two contingency variables- issue salience 
and degree of consensus. Corporations with 
constituency programs have greater impact 
on legislative decisions compared with the 
firms without one. 
  
(Shaffer 1995) Reviews articles from different 
theoretical perspectives 
Macro 
and micro  
NA NA NA Review  Review published research on CPA from 
different theoretical perspectives and levels 
of analysis. Discuss how public policies 
influence the landscape of firm’s competitive 
environment and firm’s responses to it 
through either political behavior or 
adaptation.  
 
(Hillman and 
Hitt 1999b)  
Resource dependence and 
market exchange theories; 
Resource-based view; 
institutional theory   
Firm and 
institution
al level 
Dependence on 
government 
policy; product 
diversification; 
country’s level of 
corporatism/plura
lism; firm 
resources; firm 
credibility; firm 
size 
 
Type of 
political 
strategy  
NA Conceptual The authors develop a taxonomy of firm’s 
political strategies— information, financial 
incentive, and constituency-building 
strategies.  
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Table 1. Summary of the Literature on CPA 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CPA 
Measures 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Hillman et al. 
1999) 
Research on interlocking 
directories and cooptatoion 
(reducing uncertainty through 
developing relationships with 
entities that control or have 
access to resources critical to a 
firm) 
 
Firm  Personal service 
events 
Stock 
market 
return  
Congressional 
election and 
cabinet 
appointment 
announcements  
Event Study  Shows that firm’s value is affected by one 
type of political strategy, personal service, 
that is having a firm’s executive serving as a 
government official.  
(Schuler et al. 
2002) 
 
Exchange view of politics to 
identify factors motivating firms 
to interact with legislators; use 
collective action theory, 
competitive niche theory, 
institutional theory, and resource 
dependency theory in 
hypotheses development. 
 
Firm, 
market, 
and 
institution
al 
Industry 
concentration; 
industry 
unionization; 
industry having 
congressional 
caucus; industry 
political activists; 
firm size; free 
cash flow. 
 
Likelihood 
of 
combining 
political 
tactics 
PAC 
contributions 
to 
congressional 
candidates; the 
average 
number of staff 
members (i.e. 
inside 
lobbyists) in 
Washington 
office; The 
average 
number of 
outside 
lobbyists 
retained by the 
firm. 
 
Alternating 
logistic 
regression 
model 
The authors model drivers of politically 
active firms to combine political tactics to 
gain competitive advantage. Five 
determinants, on both firm and industry 
levels, are identified. They show that 
politically active firms are more likely to 
combine political tactics. Firm size, firm free 
cash flow, industry concentration, industry 
unionization, industry having a congressional 
caucus, and other political active firms in an 
industry drive firms to combine political 
tactics.  
(Hillman et al. 
2004) 
Reviews articles from different 
theoretical perspectives 
Firm and 
public 
policy  
NA NA NA Review  Reviews literature published post Shaffer’s 
(1995) paper and provides an integrative 
model of antecedents and types and 
outcomes of CPA. 
 
(Bonardi and 
Keim 2005) 
Rational choice literature 
(information & reputation 
cascades); neoinstitutional 
literature 
Firm, 
institution
al, and 
public 
policy 
 
NA NA NA Conceptual  Investigate the process through which public 
policy issues become salient and the 
implication of widely salient issues for 
firm’s use of political activities. 
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Table 1. Summary of the Literature on CPA 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CPA 
Measures 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Bonardi et al. 
2005) 
Public policy process Firm; 
institution
al 
NA NA NA Conceptual  Argue that firm’s decision to involve in 
political strategies is partly a driven from the 
attractiveness of the political market. They 
outline the conditions under which political 
markets become more or less attractive.  
 
(Frynas et al. 
2006) 
First mover advantages (FMA); 
RBV; Resource dependence 
theory; reciprocity theory 
MNEs Government and 
political business 
environment 
factors (e.g., 
government 
interference in the 
industry and 
cooperation 
between host and 
home 
governments). 
Firm political and 
nonpolitical-
related factors. 
 
First mover 
advantages 
NA Case study  Draws on studies to show the underpinnings 
of using political resources to gain FMAs. 
Find that nonmarket strategies can 
successfully be used both first movers and 
late movers.  
(Gregory and 
Richard 2008) 
Institutional theory MNEs  NA NA NA Conceptual Examines different approaches to studying 
the role of institutions in relation to 
international business research. Argues that 
the institutional analysis used in international 
business literature is thin and that a case-
based approach to would better advance 
international business scholarship.  
 
(Oliver and 
Holzinger 
2008) 
Dynamic capabilities  Firm NA NA NA Conceptual Develop a typology of the political strategies 
that firms undertake to gain value in the 
political environment. Argue that the 
effectiveness of such strategies is a function 
of firm’s dynamic capabilities that are based 
on knowledge and influence use. 
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Table 1. Summary of the Literature on CPA 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CPA 
Measures 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Capron and 
Chatain 2008) 
RBV; Industrial organization 
economics (IO); CPA; First 
mover advantage (FMA); 
Competitive dynamics (CD) 
Firm & 
Institution
al  
Propensity to 
intervene in 
factor and 
political markets  
Actions on 
competitors’ 
resources 
NA Conceptual Argue that firms can undertake actions in the 
factor and the political environments to 
influence resource environment to their 
advantage. The authors discuss firm and 
market factors that determine the propensity 
of firms to deploy strategies to weaken their 
competitor’s resource positions, thereby 
enhancing theirs. 
  
(Lux et al. 
2011) 
No overarching theory; different 
theoretical perspectives from 
economics, management, 
sociology, and political sciences  
Institution
al; 
Market; 
firm level 
Institutional level 
drivers 
(incumbent 
politicians; 
ideology,…); 
Market level 
drivers (Industry 
concentration; 
international 
competition; 
economic 
opportunity), and 
firm level (firm 
size; corporate 
strategy) 
 
Contribution
s; Lobbying; 
Economic 
performance 
Total firm PAC 
contributions 
in $; lobbying 
expenditures $; 
combined total 
contributions 
and lobbying $ 
Meta-
analysis 
Show that out of all the factors that were 
previously believed to influence CPA, only a 
few, namely firm size, political incumbency, 
and government regulation, influence CPA 
to a large extent. They also find that CPA is 
positively associated with firm performance.  
(Lawton et al. 
2013) 
RBV; Institutional theory Firm NA NA NA Review  Review CPA research progress especially 
since Hillman et al.’s review paper by 
identifyig three domains of research based 
on their conceptual underpinnings: resources 
and capabilites, institutional  environment, 
and political environment. 
  
 
 
27 
Table 1. Summary of the Literature on CPA 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CPA 
Measures 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Hadani and 
Schuler 2013) 
Agency theory 
 
Firm (n = 
943) 
Corporate 
political 
investments 
(CPI); Board 
political service  
Firm 
performance 
(measured 
through 
market value 
and ROS) 
Cumulative 
CPI (firm’s 
total spending 
on PAC, soft 
money, and 
lobbying.  
Mixed-
effects 
model 
analysis 
Show that CPA is negatively related to 
firm’s financial performance. Also, having 
former public officials as a board member is 
associated with poorer market and 
accounting performance. The only exception 
is firms in regulated industries.  
 
(Hadani et al. 
2015) 
Agency and stewardship 
perspectives 
Firm (n = 
650) 
CPA; CEO 
discretion 
(measured by 
four indirect 
measure) 
Firm 
performance 
(market 
value, firm 
gross profit 
margin, and 
ROA) 
 
Aggregated 
PACs 
contributions 
and lobbying 
expenditures  
Mixed 
effects 
model  
Introduce CEO discretion as a boundary 
condition of the relationship between CPA 
and firm performance.  
(Lux 2016) Empirical research on CPA  Firm  Level of firm 
regulation; union 
activity; firm 
size; legal costs; 
legal costs; 
political resources 
and capabilities 
Economic 
performance 
Total PAC 
contributions; 
firm and 
employee 
contributions 
to political 
parties and 
organizations 
Time series 
regression 
analysis  
Show that political strategic fit, which is the 
degree to which firm’s actual political 
activities deviate from desired activity levels, 
operates as a dichotomous decision 
(engaging in CPA or freeriding) as opposed 
to an incremental one. Examining U.S. coal 
industry firms, the author finds that CPA is 
positively related to economic performance 
versus freeriding, which is negatively related 
to economic performance. 
   
(Schuler et al. 
2017) 
Certification literature 
(Association with high-profile 
others signals important firm 
attributes to third parties)  
Firm  Prior financial 
performance; 
Private 
ownership; 
Percentage of top 
managers with 
political 
connection; Level 
of institutional 
development 
 
Cumulative 
abnormal 
return 
(CAR) 
Number of 
official visits 
Event Study Argues that firms hosting visits from high-
profile government officials is an emergent 
form of CPA that influences shareholders’ 
valuation of the firm by conveying important 
information about the firm to the 
shareholders. It signals potential future 
government support and boosts firm’s 
legitimacy and reputation.  
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Table 1. Summary of the Literature on CPA 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CPA 
Measures 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Funk and 
Hirschman 
2017) 
Research on legal endogeneity  Firm Firms market 
actions (e.g., 
product 
innovation; 
mergers & 
acquisitions) 
 
Policy 
change 
NA Conceptual  Theorizes that firms may use market actions 
to influence public policy arena.  
(Ridge et al. 
2017) 
Research on political 
connectedness and government 
entities targeted by lobbying  
Firm Lobbying 
breadth; political 
connectedness 
Government 
contracts; 
firm 
performance
; market 
value  
Lobbying 
breadth (the 
number of 
entities and 
legislative acts 
targeted); 
Political 
connectedness 
(measured by 
the number of 
revolving door 
lobbyists 
employed). 
  
Random 
effects  
Show that aggregate lobbying expenditures 
do not necessarily lead to positive firm 
performance. Specifically, effective lobbying 
strategies are a function of the breadth of 
government entities targeted and the degree 
of political connectedness. 
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CPA and Resource-Based View of the Firm (RBV) 
One of the most used theoretical lenses in the research of CPA is the Resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm. Given the salience of these papers in advancing our 
understanding of CPA, I reviewed and summarized these papers in Table 2.  
Capron and Chatain (2008) argue that the relationship between a firm’s resources 
and competitive advantage can be better explained by considering the firm’s actions 
against its competitors’ resources in factor markets as well as political markets. Factor 
markets refer to the markets “where resources that firms need to compete in their product 
markets are exchanged” (Capron and Chatain 2008, p. 100). The political markets refers 
to “an arena in which demanders of policies (e.g., firms and consumers) interact with 
providers of policies (e.g., politicians and bureaucrats) to shape policies that favor the 
demanders’ interests” (Capron and Chatain 2008, p. 100). Firms attack competitors’ 
resource positions by targeting their resource quantity and/or effectiveness using actions 
such as preemption of scarce resource (e.g., employee poaching) in factor markets and 
preemptive acquisitions of regulated resources (e.g., acquiring taxi airport slots) in 
political markets. In addition, the authors identify market conditions and the firm 
characteristics that are associated with a firm’s propensity to act on its competitor’s 
resources in factor markets. For example, the market conditions of propensity of the firm 
to take up actions in the factor market include discontinuity (vs. matured and well-
structured markets) in resource environment, number of competitors, and existence of 
property-based resources. For a summary of the CPA conceptual research framed with 
the resource based view see Table 2. 
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Table 2. Summary of the CPA Literature Framed with RBV 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Paper 
 
IV(s) 
 
Mediator(s) 
 
Moderator(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Contributions  
McWilliams et al. 
(2002) 
Conceptual Political strategies Blocking the 
use of 
substitute 
resources for 
the rivals 
NA Rival costs; 
sustainable 
competitive 
advantage 
Propose that raising rival costs strategy can lead to 
sustainable competitive advantage for the focal firm by 
blocking the use of substitute resources for the rivals hence 
securing non-substitutability condition for the firm. 
The authors argue that the condition of resource non-
substitutability is the key to understanding the effect of 
political strategies—specifically raising rivals’ costs—on 
sustained competitive advantage for the focal firm. 
  
Dahan (2005) 
 
Conceptual NA NA NA NA Critics the conceptualizations of political resources and 
proposes a new typology based on three characteristics: 
internal versus external resources, firm-level vs collective-
level resources, and ad hoc vs semi-permanent resources. 
 
Oliver and 
Holzinger (2008) 
Conceptual Motives of political 
management (value 
creation and value 
maintenance) 
Political 
management 
strategies 
(reactive, 
anticipatory, 
defensive, 
and 
proactive) 
Dynamic 
capabilities, 
political 
dynamism 
Performance, 
competitive 
advantage 
Propose a typology of political management strategies 
named reactive, anticipatory, defensive, and proactive. The 
authors theorize that the success of these political strategies 
depends on the firm’s internally- and externally-oriented 
dynamic capabilities and the political dynamism of the 
environment.  
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Table 2. Summary of the CPA Literature Framed with RBV 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Paper 
 
IV(s) 
 
Mediator(s) 
 
Moderator(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Contributions  
Capron and 
Chatain (2008) 
Conceptual In factor markets: 
Market characteristics 
(market formation, 
number of 
competitors, existence 
of property-based 
resources)- firm 
characteristics 
(resource 
heterogeneity, 
scanning capability, 
competitor-oriented 
culture). In political 
markets: Market 
characteristics 
(institutional 
formation, number of 
politically active 
firms, degree of 
political influence of 
consumer groups)- 
firm characteristics 
(resource and lobbying 
capabilities 
heterogeneities) 
    
A firm’s 
propensity to 
target 
competitors’ 
resources in 
factor 
markets and 
political 
markets 
Competitive 
impact of the 
focal firm’s 
actions; 
inimitability of 
focal firm’s 
actions; 
competitors’’ 
retaliation 
capabilities;  
Competitors’ 
ability to 
switch to 
substitutes. 
Focal firm’s 
scarcity rents 
Argue that the relationship between firm’s resources and 
competitive advantage can be better understood by 
considering the firms’ actions against competitor’s resources 
in both factor markets and political markets.  The authors 
identify the market and firm characteristics that are 
associated with a firm’s propensity to take up actions against 
competitors’’ resources in factor markets and political 
markets.  
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Table 2. Summary of the CPA Literature Framed with RBV 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Paper 
 
IV(s) 
 
Mediator(s) 
 
Moderator(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Contributions  
Bonardi (2011) Conceptual Political resources 
possessing the 
following 
characteristics (not an 
exhaustive):  
Based on some of 
firm’s critical 
economic assets, not 
imposing high 
integration costs, 
address the needs of 
policy suppliers, 
generate credible 
commitments, cannot 
be made ineffective by 
competitors’ political 
strategies 
 
NA NA Firm’s success 
in political 
strategy  
Argues that the straight adoption of the RBV in CPA 
literature if flawed. The author argues that the traditional 
criteria of rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable are not the 
necessary conditions for political resources considering that 
political arena is different from the economic arena. 
Rehbein and 
Schuler (2015) 
Conceptual Corporate community 
programs  
Firm 
resources 
(human 
capital, 
organization
al capital, 
geographic) 
Intensity of 
corporate 
community 
programs; 
political 
market 
attractiveness 
Effectiveness 
of political 
strategies 
(information 
and 
constituency-
building) 
Examine the relationship between CSR (conceptualized as 
corporate community programs) and CPA (conceptualized 
as information and constituency-building political 
strategies). The authors purpose that the effect of CSR on 
CPA is mediated by development of firm-level resources 
(i.e. human capital, organizational capital, and geographic 
resources). 
  
 
 
33 
In the following section, I will review the literature on the second stream of non-
market strategy research— CSR.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Strategic CSR is an important stream of nonmarket strategy (Mellahi et al. 2016) 
Despite calls for integration with the CPA stream (Aguinis and Glavas 2012; Baron 2001; 
Frynas and Stephens 2015), the strategic CSR literature has mostly evolved 
independently. Strategic CSR refers to a firm’s “responsible” activities that contribute to 
its economic performance and help secure a competitive advantage for the firm regardless 
of its motive (McWilliams and Siegel 2011; McWilliams et al. 2006). In terms of theory, 
researchers have dominantly drawn upon stakeholder theory to study CSR (Mellahi et al. 
2016). With regard to CSR operationalization, researchers across disciplines have 
predominantly drawn upon the Kinder, Lydenber, and Domini (KLD) database (e.g., 
Chin et al. 2013; Hubbard 2017; Kang et al. 2016; Lenz et al. 2017; Mishra and Modi 
2016). KLD provides annual data on firms’ performance in relation to seven social issue 
aspects: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, 
human rights, and product quality and safety.  
In two conceptual papers published in HBR (2002; Porter and Kramer 2006), 
Porter and Kramer argue that unfocused corporate philanthropy activities do not help the 
corporation’s long term competitive positioning. Corporations can strategically use 
philanthropy by adopting a competitive-context approach to converge economic 
performance and social benefit. In one article, Porter and Kramer (2002) discuss the 
elements of the competitive context and how corporations can use them to influence the 
competitive context and secure a competitive advantage. According to the authors, “a 
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company’s competitive context consists of four interrelated elements of the local business 
environment that shape potential productivity” (Porter and Kramer 2002, p. 8). The four 
elements of competitive context include factor conditions (available inputs of 
production); demand conditions; the context for strategy and rivalry; and related 
supporting industries. The authors’ argument is that “philanthropy can often be the most 
cost-effective way—and sometimes the only way—to improve competitive context. It 
enables companies to leverage not only their own resources but also the existing efforts 
and infrastructure of nonprofits and other institutions.” (Porter and Kramer 2002, p. 9) 
In the next article, Porter and Kramer (2006) outline a framework that helps 
distinguish social issues based on the effect that firm’s actions have on society. The three 
categories of issues include—the generic social issues, value chain social impacts, and 
social issues related to competitive environment. Generic social issues refer to the “social 
issues that are not significantly affected by a company’s operations nor materially affect 
its long-term competitiveness” (p. 85). Value chain social impacts are “social issues that 
are significantly affected by a company’s activities in the ordinary course of business” (p. 
85). Finally, social issues related to the competitive environment are “social issues in the 
external environment that significantly affect the underlying drivers of a company’s 
competitiveness in the locations where it operates” (p. 85). The framework suggests 
which social issues to address and how to effectively do so to gain a competitive 
advantage through CSR.  
McWilliams and Siegel (2011) synthesize resource-based theory (RBT), 
economic models, and pricing models to provide a framework to ascertain the strategic 
value of CSR. This framework helps firms to quantify the value of firm’s CSR activities. 
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The CSR literature is replete with studies focused on the question “is it possible to 
do well while doing good?” Several researchers have investigated the relationship 
between CSR and firm financial performance (Barnett 2007; Jia and Zhang 2014; Kang 
et al. 2016; Mishra and Modi 2016). Several scholars have attempted to contribute to the 
scholarship on CSR by addressing the debate regarding the financial outcomes of CSR 
for the firm (Barnett 2007; Kang et al. 2016; Mishra and Modi 2016). Divergent effects 
have been reported—with some studies reporting a positive, some negative, and a few 
non-significant relationship between CSR and financial returns. 
 To help explain the divergent findings of the relationship between CSR and 
financial performance, Barnett (2007) in a conceptual paper, draws on stakeholder 
theory—with the tenant that financial benefits accrue to firms that attend to their 
stakeholders’ concerns. The author introduces a new construct named stakeholder 
influence capacity— that is the ability of a firm to use CSR to improve stakeholder 
relationships—to help build a business case for CSR. He develops a set of propositions 
that explain the contingencies on the relationship between investment in CSR and 
financial returns.  
Reviewing the literature on CSR, Kang et al. (2016) identify four mechanisms 
related to the relationship between CSR and firm performance. They call these four 
mechanisms: slack resources, good management, penance, and insurance mechanisms. 
The slack resources mechanism is based on the assumption that firms engage in CSR 
because they have slack resources due to their prosperous financial performance. The 
good management mechanism is based on the explanation that good management 
subsumes CSR and hence firm’s superior financial performance. The penance mechanism 
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posits that firms engage in CSR to attenuate the adverse effect of the past corporate social 
irresponsibility. The insurance mechanism explains that CSR serves as a backup for firms 
if and when a firm gets exposed for corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). The authors 
test these four mechanisms simultaneously in their empirical model and find that firms 
financially benefit from CSR through the good management and penance mechanisms 
and not the slack resources and insurance mechanisms. However, the authors also find 
that the penance mechanism does not offset the adverse performance effects of CSI. The 
authors conclude that CSR leads to financial performance and not the other way around. 
Mishra and Modi (2016) examined the effect of CSR on shareholder wealth. They 
posit that marketing capabilities interact with different types of CSR (based on KLD 
dimensions) to influence shareholder wealth. They draw on stakeholder theory, RBV, 
dynamic capabilities theory, and agency theory to theorize the effect of CSR on 
shareholder wealth. They use the broader view and conceptualization of marketing 
capabilities defining it as an “overarching firm ability to more efficiently convert 
available marketing resources into outputs, relative to the competition”(Mishra and Modi 
2016, p. 31). The authors show that CSR activities’ effect on stock returns and 
idiosyncratic risk become significant only with the presence of marketing capabilities. 
The authors operationalize marketing capability using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
“by measuring how close its realized sales are to the sales frontier given a certain level of 
input resources “ (Mishra and Modi 2016, p. 32). Idiosyncratic risk is measured by the 
standard deviation of the residual estimated for each firm i in year t.They also show that 
marketing capabilities interact only with certain types of CSR efforts (based on KLD 
categories) including environment, products, diversity, corporate governance, and 
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employees’ elements to influence stock returns and idiosyncratic risk. The authors show a 
positive interaction effect of these CSR elements on stock returns and a negative 
interaction effect on idiosyncratic risk. In addition, they find that marketing capabilities 
have no interaction effect with firms’ community-based efforts.  
Several scholars have examined the drivers of CEO engagement in CSR and its 
outcomes for the CEO. For example, Chin et al. (2013) draw upon echelons theory—
which posits that executives incorporate their personal beliefs and values in their strategic 
decisions—to how CEO’s political ideologies influence firm’s intensity of CSR. In a 
time-series analysis, the authors show that CEO’s political ideology influences the 
intensity of CSR as measured through KLD ratings. They also find that CEO’s ideologies 
influence their firm’s PAC contributions. In another study, Hubbard (2017) examines the 
personal consequences of CSR investments for CEOs. Specifically, the author 
investigates the interaction effect of stock returns and CSR on CEO dismissal. The author 
finds that when financial performance is good, prior investments in CSR reduce the 
likelihood of the CEO getting fired. When financial performance is poor, prior CSR 
investments, increase the likelihood of the CEO' getting fired. 
Researchers have examined the outcomes of CSR, corporate social 
irresponsibility (CSI), and their interaction effects. Many researchers differentiate CSR 
from its negative counterpart CSI (e.g., Kölbel 2017). CSI refers to the “set of corporate 
actions that negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate claims” 
(Vanessa et al. 2006, p. 852).  Lenz et al. (2017, p. 677) define it as “firms actions that 
hurt the well-being of stakeholders or society at large”.   
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Kölbel (2017) draws on stakeholder theory to investigate the effect of CSI 
coverage and its severity on firm’s financial risk. They measure CSI coverage based on 
REpRisk data that identifies CSI-related news. Using a time series analysis, the author 
shows that CSI coverage in the news media outlets increases the firm’s financial risk 
measured by credit risk, similar to previous research. As Kölbel (2017) notes: “Credit 
risk reflects the compensation required by investors to bear the risk that a firm’s debt 
repayments may not be made as promised”2.  Moreover, the reach and severity of CSI 
coverage interact to amplify this relationship. In another study, Lenz et al. (2017) 
examine the effect of CSR and CSI occurrence on firm value. They show that in the 
presence of CSI, the positive firm outcomes of CSR will be attenuated. Moreover, they 
find that CSI context plays an important role in determining firm outcomes. Specifically, 
they conceptually distinguish between two CSR approaches —same domain CSR and 
other domain CSR— and show that depending on firm’s choice of CSR approach, the 
outcomes differ. 
For a summary of the papers reviewed on CSR, see Table 3. In the next section, I 
will review the papers that have attempted to integrate the two nonmarket strategy 
components— CSR and CPA. 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Data on credit risk is obtained through credit default swaps (CDS).  
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Table 3. Summary of CSR Literature  
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CSR Measure 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Porter and 
Kramer 2002) 
NA Firm NA NA NA Conceptual(
HBR article) 
Argue that unfocused corporate 
philanthropy activities do not help 
corporation’s long-term competitive 
positioning. Corporations can 
strategically use philanthropy by 
adopting a competitive-context approach 
to converge economic performance and 
social benefit. The authors discuss 
elements of the competitive context and 
how corporations can use them to 
influence the competitive context to 
secure a competitive advantage. 
  
(Porter and 
Kramer 2006) 
NA  Firm NA NA NA Conceptual 
(HBR 
article)  
Outline a framework that helps 
distinguish social issues based on the 
effect that firms’ actions have on society. 
The three categories of issues include 
generic social issues, value chain social 
impacts, and social issues relating the 
competitive environment. Moreover, the 
framework suggests which social issues 
to address and how to effectively do so to 
gain a competitive advantage through 
CSR. 
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Table 3. Summary of CSR Literature  
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CSR Measure 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Barnett 2007) Stakeholder theory 
(financial benefits accrue 
to firms that attend to their 
stakeholders’ concerns)  
Firm CSR Stakeholder 
relations; 
stakeholder 
influence 
capacity; social 
change, 
financial 
performance. 
  
NA Conceptual  Introduces a new construct, stakeholder 
influence capacity— that is the ability of 
a firm to use CSR to improve stakeholder 
relationships—to help build a business 
case for CSR. This helps explain the 
divergent findings of the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance. 
 
(McWilliams and 
Siegel 2011) 
RBT; economic models; 
pricing models  
Firm NA NA NA Conceptual  Synthesize RBT, economic models, and 
pricing models to provide a framework to 
ascertain the strategic value of CSR. 
  
(Chin et al. 2013) Echelons theory 
(executives incorporate 
their personal beliefs and 
values in their strategic 
decisions) 
Firm 
(n=249) 
CEO political 
liberalism 
CSR KLD ratings to 
measure annual 
CSR profile  
Time series 
analysis  
Show that CEO’s political ideologies 
influence the intensity of CSR. 
Moreover, CEO’s political ideology 
influences their firm’s PAC 
contributions. 
  
(Frynas and 
Stephens 2015) 
Legitimacy theory; 
resource-based view; 
Habermasian political 
theory; institutional 
theory; stakeholder theory  
Peer-
reviewed 
academic 
articles 
and 
journals  
NA NA NA Review  Review the theories within political CSR 
literature and suggest future theory 
development directions. Political CSR 
refers to activities that have an impact in 
the political arena. They find that 
institutional and stakeholder theories 
prevail political CSR scholarship. 
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Table 3. Summary of CSR Literature  
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CSR Measure 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Kang et al. 
2016) 
Build their model based 
on economic theory. 
  
Firm CSR, CSI Financial 
performance 
measured by 
Tobin’s q 
KLD Structural 
panel vector 
auto 
regression 
specification  
Identify four mechanisms, explaining the 
relationship between CSR and firm 
financial performance, suggested in the 
literature. They test these four 
mechanisms simultaneously to examine 
capture the simultaneous effect among 
CSR, CSI, and financial performance. 
The authors find that firms benefit from 
CSR financially because they engage in it 
and not the other way around. 
   
(Mishra and 
Modi 2016) 
Stakeholder theory, RBV, 
Dynamic capabilities 
theory, Agency theory. 
  
Firm Relative 
marketing 
capability; CSR 
Stock returns; 
idiosyncratic 
risk 
KLD Empirical 
modeling 
Investigate the effect of CSR on 
shareholder wealth. The authors posit that 
marketing capabilities interact with CSR 
types (based on KLD) to influence stock 
returns and idiosyncratic risk.  
 
(Hubbard 2017) CSR literature  Firm The interaction of 
stock returns and 
CSR 
CEO dismissal Rankings of 5 
dimensions 
(employee, 
community, 
diversity, 
environment, 
and product) 
from KLD data 
Random-
effects 
model 
clustered by 
firm 
Examined personal consequences of CSR 
investments for CEOs. When financial 
performance is good, prior investments in 
CSR reduce the likelihood of the CEO 
getting fired. When financial 
performance is poor, prior CSR 
investments, increase the likelihood of 
the CEO getting fired.  
  
(Kölbel 2017) Stakeholder theory  Firm 
(n=539) 
CSI coverage; 
severity of CSI 
coverage;  
Financial risk CSI coverage 
measure based 
on RepRisk data 
that identifies 
CSI related 
news. 
  
Time series 
method 
using two-
way fixed 
effects 
Show that CSI coverage in the news 
media outlets has risk generating effects 
for the firm that will increase firm’s 
financial risk. Moreover, the reach and 
severity of CSI coverage interact to 
amplify this relationship.   
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Table 3. Summary of CSR Literature  
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Analysis 
level 
 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
CSR Measure 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Lenz et al. 2017) Stakeholder theory  Firm CSR and CSI 
occurrence  
Firm Value  Construct CSR 
variable from 
KLD through a 
scaling 
procedure  
Linear 
mixed 
modeling 
Show that in the presence of CSI, the 
positive firm outcomes of CSR will be 
attenuated. Moreover, they find that CSI 
context plays an important role in 
determining firm outcomes. Specifically, 
they conceptually distinguish between 
two CSR approaches —same domain 
CSR and other domain CSR— and show 
that depending on firm’s choice of CSR 
approach, the outcomes differ. 
 
 
 
 
43 
Integration of the Literature Streams of Non-Market Strategy  
As mentioned earlier, the CPA and CSR streams of research on nonmarket 
strategy have evolved independent of each other. Some researchers have moved the 
scholarship on nonmarket strategy forward by synthesizing and bringing these disparate 
streams of research under an overarching framework (Doh et al. 2012; Dorobantu et al. 
2017; Mellahi et al. 2016). For a summary, see Table 4.   
For example, Mellahi et al. (2016) proposes an integrative framework that 
includes the key drivers, mediating, and moderating variables involved in the link 
between nonmarket strategy and corporate performance. The authors integrate and 
synthesize two streams of nonmarket strategy, CPA and CSR, in an attempt to integrate 
multi-theory perspectives used in the study of these two streams. In this framework, 
external drivers of nonmarket strategy are obtaining legitimacy (institutional theory), 
obtaining the support of salient stakeholders (stakeholder theory), and ensuring the flow 
of critical resources (resource dependence theory). The internal drivers are developing 
valuable nonmarket resources (resource-based view) and satisfying managers’ private 
needs (agency theory). 
Dorobantu et al. (2017), using new institutional economic perspective, develop a 
typology of nonmarket strategies by connecting different streams of nonmarket strategy 
research. The six types include internalization, partnership, proactive, collective, 
influence, and coalition. This typology is grounded in the argument that firms undertake 
nonmarket strategies to minimize the market transaction costs of appropriating and 
protecting value. These institutional costs arise from the attributes of the environment 
within which the firm operates. In response to high institutional costs, firms formulate 
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nonmarket strategies based on two key decisions: strategic goal (adapt, augment, and 
transform the institutional environment) and level of participation (act as independent 
firm vs. collaborating with other firms). 
In the following section, I will review the literature on private politics, which is 
when interest and activist groups influence economic activity without relying on public 
officeholders or institutions. Private politics influences a firm’s nonmarket strategy 
(Baron 2001). Given its relevance, I will review the literature on private politics to build 
a base knowledge of its interplay with nonmarket strategy. 
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Table 4. Studies Integrating Nonmarket Strategy Research 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical perspective 
 
Main Proposition of the theory related to 
nonmarket strategy 
 
 
Contributions 
(Baron 1995) Porter’s value chain Porter’s value chain  Develops a strategy system that relates 
to nonmarket environment and helps 
deal with nonmarket environment 
issues. Adopting the analogy of a 
value chain, the author uses the notion 
of rent chain to delineate how firms 
can address nonmarket issues. Baron’s 
strategy system involves formulation 
of concerted strategy integrating 
market and nonmarket components. 
 
(Doh et al. 2012) Institutional and strategic 
perspective to nonmarket strategy 
The institutional boundaries of the firm 
interact with the firm’s nonmarket strategy to 
affect outcomes such as superior profits.  
Strategy perspective: “the role and impact of 
institutions on strategy vary depending on 
home or host country, industry, strategic 
group, and firm specificity” (p. 28) 
 
Review the literature and argue that 
integration of institutional and 
strategic perspectives on nonmarket 
strategy provides a fruitful path in the 
evolution of the nonmarket strategy 
scholarship.  
 
(Mellahi et al. 
2016) 
Integration of institutional theory, 
stakeholder theory, RDT, RBV, 
and agency theory.  
Institutional theory, stakeholder theory, RDT, 
and RBV are used to theorize the mediators 
of the relationship between nonmarket 
strategy and firm performance. Agency 
theory is mostly drawn on to theorize the 
moderators. 
 
Synthesize and integrate two streams 
of nonmarket strategy literature, CPA 
and CSR, to better explain the effect 
of nonmarket strategy on firm 
performance. 
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Table 4. Studies Integrating Nonmarket Strategy Research 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical perspective 
 
Main Proposition of the theory related to 
nonmarket strategy 
 
 
Contributions 
(Dorobantu et al. 
2017) 
New institutional economics Grounded in the argument that firms 
undertake nonmarket strategies to minimize 
the market transaction costs of appropriating 
and protecting value. Institutional costs arise 
from the attributes of the environment within 
which the firm operates. In response to high 
institutional costs firms formulate nonmarket 
strategies based on two key decisions: 
strategic goal (adapt, augment, and transform 
the institutional environment) and level of 
participation (act as independent firm vs. 
collaborating with other firms). 
The authors develop a typology of 
nonmarket strategies by connecting 
different streams of nonmarket 
strategy research. The six types 
include internalization, partnership, 
proactive, collective, influence, and 
coalition.  
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Private Politics 
As reviewed earlier, firms utilize nonmarket strategies to influence the public 
policy arena. However, firms’ attempts to gain favorable public policy decisions face 
challenges from interest and activist groups (Bonardi and Keim 2005). Baron (2001) 
defines the term “activist” as “a player that seeks to change the practices of a firm. 
Activists can include activist organizations, interest groups, unions, watchdog 
organizations, and their nonmarket allies and coalition partners” (p. 12).  
Scholars distinguish between public and private politics (Baron 2003; Baron 
2001). Both are mechanisms that affect economic activity. In public politics, interest and 
activist groups, such as labor unions and environmental groups, influence public 
officeholders to gain advantage. Through private politics, interest and activist groups 
affect economic activity without relying on public officeholders or institutions. Private 
politics influences a firm’s nonmarket strategy (Baron 2001).  
Boycott and shareholder activism are two important tools of private politics (Reid 
and Toffel 2009). Boycott is a tactic used by the activist to force corporations to change 
its practices. Shareholder activism refers to the “use of ownership position to actively 
influence company policy and practice” (Sjöström 2008, p. 142). These two concepts are 
further elaborated in the following section.  
Through private politics, activist groups demand redistribution of income, wealth, 
and property from the shareholders to its own members, potential recipients whom they 
advocate, or a cause with which they are concerned (Baron 2003). Private politics has a 
direct and strategic effect on firm’s integrated market and nonmarket strategy through the 
change of firm’s competitive position in an industry (Baron 2001). The theory of private 
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politics (Baron 2001) has implications for firm’s integrated strategy, including market 
and nonmarket components, both in the absence of competition and in a competitive 
landscape. When a firm’s competitive advantage is not affected, using a nonmarket 
strategy (i.e. contesting the issue) can counter the threat of an activist, reduce the 
likelihood of a successful boycott, and increase firm’s profit prospects. When a firm’s 
competitive advantage is targeted, deploying nonmarket strategy can have an even greater 
return since it can reduce the adverse effect of the activist’s actions on competitive 
advantage relative to the competitors (Baron 2001).  
In my review of the literature on private politics, I have identified two important 
streams of research: boycotts and shareholder activism. In the next section, I will define 
these two concepts and review published research of each stream in detail. Figure 3 
illustrates the schema of my literature review on private politics. 
Figure 3. Private Politics Literature Review Schema 
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Boycotts 
As mentioned earlier, boycott is an important tool of private politics (Baron 2003; 
Reid and Toffel 2009). Traditionally, boycott has been viewed as a form of organized 
protest (Pruitt and Friedman 1986a). King (2008) defines boycott as “a widely used 
movement tactic for activists trying to persuade corporate targets to adopt some change in 
practice or policy” (p. 398). The term “boycott” has also been used in the literature to 
refer to an activist’s campaign directed at a firm with the aim of changing the firm’s 
practices (Baron 2001). Activist groups use boycotts because boycotts have proven to be 
effective in influencing corporations. However, the effectiveness of boycotts varies. 
Several researchers have investigated the effect of boycotts on stock market prices 
(Davidson et al. 1995; Pruitt and Friedman 1986a; Pruitt et al. 1988). For example, Pruitt 
and Friedman (1986a) examined the effect of union boycotts on stock market prices. The 
authors find that union boycotts initially have a significant negative effect on stock 
market prices. However, this effect is not long lasting and disappears in about two trading 
weeks. 
Pruitt et al. (1988) investigate the effect of consumer boycotts on stock market 
prices. They found that consumer boycott announcements have a significantly negative 
effect on stock market prices as well as the firm’s overall market value. Davidson et al. 
(1995) examined the effect of boycotts and stock divestiture announcements on 
shareholder’s reactions. The authors show that boycotts are negatively associated with 
stock market prices. Whereas divestiture announcements have no significant effect on 
market reactions. 
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Several researchers have attempted to examine corporate responses to boycotts 
(Bonardi and Keim 2005; King 2008; McDonnell et al. 2015; McDonnell and King 
2013). For example, King (2008) drawing on the theory of social movement outcomes 
and the political mediation model, examines the determinants of firm’s concessions to 
boycotter’s demand. They show that both the characteristics of the firms targeted and the 
attributes of the activist movements predict corporate concessions. Specifically, social 
movements receiving significant media attention are more likely to successfully exert 
influence on the targeted firm. Firms having decline in sales and reputation are more 
likely to concede to boycotter’s demands.  
McDonnell and King (2013) draw on impression management and social 
movement theories to explores firm’s strategic reactions to restore their reputation after 
an attack by social movement boycotters. Firms’ pre-threat reputation, the magnitude of 
the threat captured by the amount of media attention, and the firm’s pre-threat impression 
management repertoire influence the firm’s post-threat impression management in the 
form of prosocial claims. Similarly, McDonnell et al. (2015) Show that stakeholder 
activism (e.g., boycotting, shareholder resolutions, etc.) drives firms to make structural 
reforms to mitigate the adverse effects by adopting social management devices (i.e. 
annual CSR reports and CSR committees). This will in turn make the firms more 
receptive of being target of activist challenges in the future. Moreover, firm’s historical 
performance in terms of sales and reputation, moderate the relationship between activist 
movements and firm’s giving in to their demands.  
For a summary of the literature on private politics and boycotts see Table 5. 
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Table 5. Summary of Literature on Private Politics and Boycotts 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical 
perspective 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Pruitt and 
Friedman 
1986b) 
Union-
sponsored 
boycott literature 
Firm and 
market 
Union boycott 
announcements 
Abnormal returns  Event study Investigate the effect of union boycotts on stock 
market prices. The authors find that union 
boycotts initially have a significant negative 
effect on stock market prices. However, this 
effect is not long lasting and disappears in about 
two ensuing trading weeks. 
  
(Pruitt et al. 
1988) 
Consumer 
boycott literature 
Firm and 
market 
Consumer boycott 
announcements 
Abnormal returns Event study Investigated the effect of consumer boycotts on 
stock market prices. They found that consumer 
boycott announcements have a significantly 
negative effect on stock market prices as well as 
firm’s overall market value. 
  
(Davidson et 
al. 1995) 
Agency theory Firm Boycott and 
divestiture 
announcements 
Common stock 
returns 
Event study Examine the effect of boycotts and stock 
divestiture announcements on shareholder’s 
reactions. Results show that boycotts are 
negatively associated with stock market prices, 
whereas divestiture announcements have no 
significant effect on market reactions. 
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Table 5. Summary of Literature on Private Politics and Boycotts 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical 
perspective 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(Baron 2001) Theory of 
private politics 
Firm and 
market levels 
Private politics; 
CSR motives 
Redistribution of 
income, wealth, 
and property from 
the shareholders 
to interest groups’ 
own members 
Quantitative 
modeling 
Develops a theory of private politics in which 
interest and activist groups attempt to alter firm’s 
production practices to favor the cause they 
support without relying on public institutions. 
Private politics has implications for the firm’s 
integrated strategy since it changes firm’s 
market’s position in the competitive landscape. 
The author also addresses disparate CSR 
outcomes by distinguishing among firm’s 
motives—maximizing profit, altruism, and in 
response to threats by activist groups. 
  
(Baron 2003) Theory of 
private politics 
Firm and 
market levels 
NA NA Conceptual  Introduces an agenda for furthering research in 
the area of private politics by discussing four 
models of private politics: competition to gain 
support from the public, consumer decisions 
regarding a boycott, terms of resolution of a 
boycott, and equilibrium private ordering aimed 
at managing the ongoing conflicting interests of 
activist groups and firms. 
 
(King 2008) Theory of social 
movement 
outcomes; The 
political 
mediation model 
Firm  Level of media 
attention; Decline 
in sales and 
reputation 
Corporate 
concession to 
boycotter’s 
demand 
Longitudinal 
analysis 
Examines the determinants of firm’s concessions 
to boycotter’s demand. They show that both the 
characteristics of the firms targeted, and the 
attributes of the activist movements predict 
corporate concessions. Specifically, social 
movements receiving significant media attention 
are more likely to successfully exert influence on 
the targeted firm. 
  
 
 
53 
Table 5. Summary of Literature on Private Politics and Boycotts 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theoretical 
perspective 
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Method 
 
Contributions 
(McDonnell 
and King 
2013) 
Impression 
management; 
Social 
movement 
theory 
Firm and 
market  
Reputational 
threat of boycotts; 
firm’s reputation; 
shareholder 
resolutions 
targeting others in 
the industry; 
Regulatory threat 
Firm’s prosocial 
claims post 
boycott 
Longitudinal 
analysis 
Explores firm’s strategic reactions to restore their 
reputation after an attack by social movement 
boycotters. Firms’ pre threat reputation, the 
magnitude of the threat captured by the amount 
of media attention and firm’s pre threat 
impression management repertoire influence 
firm’s post threat impression management in the 
form of prosocial claims. 
  
(McDonnell et 
al. 2015) 
Social 
movement 
theory 
Firm (n=300) Stakeholder 
activism 
Social 
management 
devices (i.e. CSR 
report and CSR 
committee); 
Firm’s receptivity 
to activist 
challenges 
Longitudinal 
analysis 
Show that stakeholder activism (e.g., boycotting, 
shareholder resolutions, etc.) drives firms to 
make structural reforms to mitigate the adverse 
effects by adopting social management devices 
(i.e. annual CSR reports and CSR committees). 
This will in turn make the firms more receptive of 
being target of activist challenges in the future. 
Moreover, firm’s historical performance in terms 
of sales and reputation, moderate the relationship 
between activist movements and the firm’s giving 
in to their demands. 
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Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism, also known as investor activism (David et al. 2007), is 
another popoular tool of private politics used by “shareholder activists” to directly target 
companies (Baron and Diermeier 2007b). Shareholder activism has been defined as the 
“use of ownership position to actively influence company policy and practice” (Sjöström 
2008, p. 142). In finance literature, shareholder activist has been refered to as 
“entrepreneurial activist”. Klein and Zur (2009) define the entrepreneurial activist as “an 
investor who buys a large stake in a publicly held corporation with the intention to bring 
about change and thereby realize a profit on the investment” (p. 187).  
 Shareholder activists exert influence on firms using different methods such as 
direct communication with management (Smith 1996), submitting shareholder proposals 
(Gillan and Starks 2000), and shareholder amendments (Smith 1996). Filing formal 
shareholder resolutions to be voted on at shareholders’ annual meetings is the most 
commonly studied form of shareholder activism in the literature (Sjöström 2008). 
The history of shareholder activism in the U.S. dates back to 1942, when 
shareholers were given permission by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
propose resolutions to be voted on by all the shareholders in the shareholder’s annual 
meetings. Initially, mostly individual investors filed formal shareholder resoulutions and 
their resoulutions were mainly ignored. In the mid 80s, institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, entered the shareholder activism scene and played a more influential role 
(Gillan and Starks 2000; Gillan and Starks 2007; Sjöström 2008). 
My literature review reveals that shareholder activism has been mostly 
operationalized and measured by the number of shareholder proposals (e.g., Goranova et 
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al. 2017). From the activist’s perspective, the effectiveness of shareholder activism has 
been measured through the voting outcomes of the proposed resulution (e.g., Gillan and 
Starks 2000; Klein and Zur 2009). 
Several researchers have investigated antecedents of shareholder activism 
(Goranova et al. 2017; Goranova and Ryan 2014a; Ryan and Schneider 2002). For 
example, Ryan and Schneider (2002) provide an integrative model of twelve variables 
influencing shareholders activists’ propensity to engage in activism. Fund size, 
investment time span, focus on social or financial agenda, whether a fund has business 
relationships with a firm beyond their investor role, size of shares owned by the fund, 
size of the activists’ portfolio invested in a firm, proportion invested in equity, legal 
restraints, whether the fund is defined-benefit or defined-contribution, investing style 
(active vs. passive investing), internal or external management, and finally internal vs. 
external proxy voting rights are the theorized factors in Ryan and Schneider’s (2002) 
model to determine the level of shareholder activism.     
Goranova et al. (2017) draw upon agency theory to examine the debated effect of 
corporate governance on shareholder activism by developing a model with two 
components: 1) shareholder’s propensity to target a firm and 2) firm’s propensity to 
negotiate demands privately and settle them. In this model, the authors account for 
shareholder’s heterogeneity in interests. Firm’s governance is measured through seven 
independent variables—CEO compensation, CEO ownership, board independence, CEO 
duality, board size, institutional ownership, and the largest institutional owner. The 
authors find that corporate governance relationship with shareholder activism is complex 
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and varies across shareholder number of proposals and success/failure of private 
negotiations. 
Scholars have examined the relationship between shareholder activism and 
various organizational practices and outcomes, such as corporate social performance 
(David et al. 2007; Johnson and Greening 1999), stock market reactions (Gillan and 
Starks 2000; Klein and Zur 2009), and firm’s adoption of public disclosures (Reid and 
Toffel 2009).  
For example, Johnson and Greening (1999), grounding their theorization in 
institutional and signaling theories, show that institutional holdings are associated with 
corporate social performance. The authors examine the effect of two main types of 
institutional investors- pension funds and investment management funds- and 
governance-related variables on two different dimensions of corporate social 
performance (CSP)— people and product quality dimensions. They found that pension 
fund equity holding is positively associated with both dimensions of CSP. Unlike 
investment management funds that showed no direct relationship with CSP. Top 
management equity holding was positively associated with product quality dimension of 
CSP and unrelated to people dimension. Outside management representation was also 
positively associated with both dimensions of CSP. 
David et al. (2007), drawing on shareholder salience theory show that shareholder 
proposal activism is negatively related to corporate social performance (CSP). They 
suggest that rather than having a “disciplining” function and increasing subsequent CSP, 
shareholder proposal activism, serves a “signaling” function, driving managers to divert 
resources away from CSP and utilizing them toward maintaining their discretion. Gillan 
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and Starks (2000) examine the effectiveness of shareholder activism through shareholder 
proposals by analyzing voting outcomes and market reactions. The authors show that 
voting outcomes are influenced by the proposal type (i.e. antitakeover-related issues, 
voting issues, board-related issues, and other) and sponsor identity (i.e. institutional 
investors, investment groups, and individual and religious organizations). Specifically, 
proposals sponsored by individual investors are associated with less number of votes and 
a small positive effect on stock market, whereas proposals put forth by coordinated obtain 
more votes and are associated with a small negative effect on stock market prices.  
Klein and Zur (2009) Examine the determinants and outcomes of aggressive or 
confrontational campaigns of two shareholder activist groups: hedge fund activists and 
other investor activists including individual activists, asset management groups, venture 
capital firms, and private equity funds. The authors find similarities and differences 
between the two groups. In terms of similarity, activist groups’ actions drive a 
significantly positive market reaction for the targeted firm and they secure a success rate 
in achieving their initial goals. The two groups are different in that hedge funds target 
cash flow issues within the firms whereas the other group address the targeted firm’s 
investment strategies. 
The summary of literature on shareholder activism is shown in Table 6. In the 
following section, I will review literature on two major streams of research in shareholder 
activism.  
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Table 6. Summary of the Literature on Shareholder Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Theory 
 
Level of 
analysis 
 
IV(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Method 
 
Contribution 
(David et al. 
2007) 
Shareholder 
salience theory  
Firm (n=218) Shareholder 
salience (criteria 
of power, 
legitimacy, and 
urgency); 
Shareholder 
proposal 
activism. 
Responsiveness to 
shareholder 
proposal activism; 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
Regression 
analysis 
Show that shareholder proposal activism is 
negatively related to corporate social performance 
(CSP). They suggest that rather than having a 
“disciplining” function and increasing subsequent 
CSP, shareholder proposal activism, serves a 
“signaling” function, driving managers to divert 
resources away from CSP and utilizing them toward 
maintaining their discretion. 
  
(Gillan and 
Starks 2000) 
Shareholder 
activism 
literature 
Firm Shareholder 
activism by 
institutional 
/individual 
investors 
Effectiveness of 
shareholder 
activism measured 
through the voting 
outcomes and 
stock market 
reaction to the 
proposals.  
Event study Examine the effectiveness of shareholder activism 
through shareholder proposals by analyzing voting 
outcomes and market reactions. The authors show 
that voting outcomes are influenced by the proposal 
type (i.e. antitakeover-related issues, voting issues, 
board-related issues, and other) and sponsor identity 
(i.e. institutional investors, investment groups, and 
individual and religious organizations). Specifically, 
proposals sponsored by individual investors are 
associated with less number of votes and a small 
positive effect on stock market, whereas proposals 
put forth by coordinated shareholders obtain more 
votes and are associated with a small negative effect 
on stock market prices. 
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Table 6. Summary of the Literature on Shareholder Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Theory 
 
Level of 
analysis 
 
IV(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Method 
 
Contribution 
(Klein and Zur 
2009) 
Shareholder 
activism 
finance 
literature  
Firm and 
market 
Shareholder 
activism by 
hedge funds; 
activism by other 
investor groups 
Stock market 
returns; Activists 
success rate in 
achieving their 
goals 
Event study; 
logistic 
models 
Examine the determinants and outcomes of 
aggressive or confrontational campaigns of two 
shareholder activist groups: hedge fund activists and 
other investor activists including individual activists, 
asset management groups, venture capital firms, and 
private equity funds. The authors find similarities 
and differences between the two groups. In terms of 
similarity, activist groups’ actions drive a 
significantly positive market reaction for the targeted 
firm and they secure a success rate in achieving their 
initial goals. The two groups are different in that 
hedge funds target cash flow issues within the firms 
whereas the other group address the targeted firm’s 
investment strategies. 
  
(George and 
Lorsch 2014) 
NA NA NA NA Case-based Discusses activist investors’ challenges to the 
company and how companies should respond to their 
challenges. In summary, the authors urge companies 
to heed their fiduciary duties to their long-term 
shareholders. 
  
(Goranova and 
Ryan 2014a) 
Agency theory  Firm and 
market 
Firm, activist, 
and environment 
level antecedents 
of shareholder 
activism; the 
processes of 
shareholder 
activism. 
 
Shareholder 
activism outcomes 
for the firm, the 
activist, and the 
environment 
Literature 
review 
Review literature on shareholder activism and 
provides an integrative framework of the 
antecedents, processes, and outcomes of it. The 
review looks into both the financial and social 
activism branches.  
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Table 6. Summary of the Literature on Shareholder Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Theory 
 
Level of 
analysis 
 
IV(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Method 
 
Contribution 
(Goranova et 
al. 2017) 
Agency theory Firm Firm’s 
governance 
measured 
through 7 IVs: 
CEO 
compensation, 
CEO ownership, 
board 
independence, 
CEO duality, 
board size, 
institutional 
ownership, and 
largest 
institutional 
owner. 
  
Shareholder 
activism measured 
by number of 
shareholder 
proposals 
Bayesian 
method 
The authors examine the debated effect of corporate 
governance on shareholder activism by developing a 
model that incorporates two components: 1) 
shareholder’s propensity to target a firm and 2) 
firm’s propensity to negotiate demands privately and 
settle them. This model accounts for shareholder’s 
heterogeneity in interests. 
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Economic and Social Shareholder Activism 
In my review of the literature on shareholder activism, I identified two streams of 
research—shareholder social activism and financial/economic shareholder activism. In 
social shareholder activism, proposals submitted by individual investors or investor 
groups such as religious organizations and pension funds, are concerned with social and 
environmental issues and are intended to “direct attention, raise awareness, and challenge 
corporations to improve their corporate social performance” (David et al. 2007, p. 91).  
In 1970, SEC ruled that shareholder proposals that were concerned with social 
and environmental issues should not be omitted from companies’ proxy statements 
(Proffitt and Spicer 2006; Vogel 1983) and ever since, increasing numbers of social 
shareholder resolutions have been included in the proxy statements of the companies for 
the shareholders to vote on.  
On the other hand, financial shareholder activism, primarily focused on 
governance-related issues, was precipitated by the rise of institutional ownership (Gillan 
and Starks 2000; Gillan and Starks 2007). Financial shareholder activists “seek to 
improve governance structures and render managers more accountable to firm 
shareholders” (Goranova and Ryan 2014b, p. 1233). 
Shareholder Social Activism 
In this section, I review the literature relevant to socially motivated shareholder 
activism. I first present the concept and definition of social shareholder activism. Next, I 
discuss the antecedents of shareholder social activism from three distinct perspectives: 1) 
firm-level antecedents that stimulate social shareholder activists to target the firm 2) 
activist related factors prompting actions against the firm, and 3) issue-related factors. 
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Moreover, I will review and discuss social shareholder activism outcomes distinguished 
by firm and activist outcomes. I present my synthesis of prior research in a multilevel 
model (Figure 4). The papers that are reviewed in this section are tabulated in Table 7. 
Shareholder social activism is a type of shareholder activism that is used often by activist 
shareholders to raise awareness about social issues and influence corporations to enhance 
their corporate social performance (David et al. 2007; Sjöström 2008). The history of 
social shareholder activism dates back to early 1970s, when breaking with historical 
precedence, an organization named Project on Corporate Responsibility filed resolutions 
that were concerned with social issues to be voted on the annual shareholder meeting of 
General Motors. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ruled that the 
resolutions be included in the proxy statement of the company (Vogel 1983). Since then, 
there has been an increasing trend in shareholder resolutions concerning social 
dimensions (Proffitt and Spicer 2006; Tkac 2006; Vogel 1983). Religious organizations 
were the innovators and champions of social shareholder activism and set the agenda by 
galvanizing support from other investor groups, thus legitimizing such activism (Proffitt 
and Spicer 2006). Pension funds were the second investor group that entered the 
shareholder activism scene and played a determining role in agenda creation (Proffitt and 
Spicer 2006). Shareholder social activists such as individuals, religious institutions, 
hedge funds, socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, and large pension funds use a 
number of actions including engaging in dialogue with corporate management, initiating 
or supporting legal action against management, voting to influence corporate governance, 
and filing shareholder proposals to reach their goals (Sjöström 2008).
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Shareholder 
Social Activism 
 
Firm Outcomes 
- Performance 
(mixed results) 
o Positive 
o No effect 
o Negative 
effect 
- Governance 
 
Activist Outcomes 
- Reinforcement 
of values 
- Identity 
affirmation 
(Rowley and 
Moldoveanu 
2003) 
  
 
Firm  
- Firm Size (Rehbein 
et al. 2004) 
- Environmental or 
social performance  
(Rehbein et al. 2004) 
- Type of firm (Tkac 
2006) 
 
Activist 
- Identity-based 
motives (Rehbein et 
al. 2004) 
- Type of investor 
(Johnson and 
Greening 1999) 
- Size of the fund 
 
 
Issue/Environment 
- Urgent 
- Salient  
 
Figure 4. Shareholder Social Activism: Antecedents and Outcomes 
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Shareholder social activism forms 
Shareholder social activists use many actions to challenge corporations to abide 
by their social responsibilities and to influence corporation’s policy and practice. Filing 
of shareholder proposals concerning environmental and social issues is the most 
commonly used action by social shareholder activists (David et al. 2007; Proffitt and 
Spicer 2006; Tkac 2006; Vogel 1983). In one of the earliest studies in this regard, Vogel 
(1983) looks into the first thirteen-year trend of public interest proxy resolutions after its 
conception. The author concludes that the heterogeneity in the political leanings of 
shareholder activists using the proxy process helps protect the rights of shareholders to 
not to be influenced by changes in the political arena. In another study, Proffitt and 
Spicer (2006), examine the role of activist funds in moving forward the issues of human 
rights and labor standards, which they call global social issues, through shareholder 
proposals filed between 1969 and 2003. Using a social movement perspective, the 
authors show that religious organizations paved the way and legitimized social issue 
activism agenda. Religious organizations were followed by public pension funds, which 
also had a prominent role in pushing the agenda forward. The authors also challenge prior 
works’ suggestion that fund size is an important predictor of shareholder activism (Ryan 
and Schneider 2002) given that it does not explain religious organization’s activism. 
Instead, they argue that moral and ethical concerns underlie social shareholder activism 
and suggest that any type of shareholder activism is morally motivated. That is, instead of 
corporate governance activism being a different type than social issue activism, they are 
both ignited by core beliefs about how corporate management should be run.  
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Shareholder social activism antecedents 
In past research, the “performance expection” of activist funds—that is fund’s 
managers’ focus on financial measures or social and environmental agendas— has been 
proposed to influence the level of shareholder activism (Ryan and Schneider 2002). 
There’s been a growing but scattered body of literature on socially oriented shareholder 
activism and in the following section I will explain antecedents that propell social 
shareholder activism from both firm and activist’s perspectives. 
Firm-level antecedents 
Activists target firms to cause firms to change their practice or policy (Tkac 
2006). Firm size is one of the important factors that has been shown to prompt social 
shareholder activists to target firms (Rehbein et al. 2004; Ryan and Schneider 2002; Tkac 
2006). Rehbein et al. (2004) drew on Rowley and Moldoveanu’s (2003) model of 
stakeholder group action to examine how shareholder activists select their target firms. 
According to Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003), stakeholders’ interest is not the only 
driver and determinant of stakeholder mobilization and that stakeholder mobilization is a 
function of both identity expression and affirmation along with interest protection. That 
is, stakeholder actions vary given their motives. For example, the authors theorize that as 
interest overlap between stakeholders’ different membership groups increase, so does the 
likelihood that they mobilize on that motive (interest-based perspective). In addition, the 
liklihood of stakeholder groups undertaking action varies based on their desire to express 
identity- the is rooted in maximally differenetiating them from other stakeholder groups’ 
identity (identity-based perspective). Basing their hypotheses on both the interest-based 
and identity-based perspectives, Rehbein et al. (2004) show that firm size and firm 
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performance with regards to social and environmental issues are two important predictors 
of which firms shareholder activists select to target with their resolutions. The authors 
show that larger firms and socially and environmentally poorly performing firms are 
targeted more. In another study, Tkac (2006), examining thirteen-year trend of 
shareholder proposals, found that larger and therefore more recognized firms were 
targeted more often. Type of firm (manufacturing vs. service or technology firm) has also 
been found in the past research to instigate shareholder social activism. For example, in a 
study that examined shareholder social activism between 1992 to 2002 period, Tkac 
(2006) found that manufacturing firms that had operations causing significant 
environmental, specifically air polluting, impact and firms with operations overseas, 
where labor cost is cheap, were more frequently targeted by shareholder activist groups. 
Therefore, manufacturing firms were more targeted compared with service and 
technology firms .  
In summary, based on the results of these studies larger, and more high-profile 
firms are more frequently targeted by shareholder social activists due to their larger 
environmental and social impacts and also due to the fact that targeting them attracts 
more attention to issues being voiced. In addition, firms with poor corporate social 
performance are selected as targets with the hope of correcting their behavior.   
Activist-level antecedents 
As discussed before, shareholder activists sometimes are not motivated by 
financial goals (Johnson and Greening 1999). These type of activists have identity-based 
motives (Rehbein et al. 2004; Rowley and Moldoveanu 2003). 
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Size of the fund and type of institutional investor (Johnson and Greening 1999) have been 
shown to instigate social shareholder activism.  
My synthesis of the literature from various disciplines on social shareholder activism 
reveals that most of the studies conducted are descriptive and lack a strong theoretical 
foundation. 
Shareholder Social Activism Outcomes 
Firm outcomes 
Corporate social activism has been associated with corporate social performance 
(David et al. 2007; Johnson and Greening 1999), firms’ use of financial and relational 
CPA (Hadani et al. 2016), and firm’s decision about adopting public disclosures (Reid 
and Toffel 2009). 
For example, David et al. (2007) drew on shareholder salience theory to Show 
that shareholder proposal activism is negatively related to corporate social performance 
(CSP). They suggest that rather than having a “disciplining” function and increasing 
subsequent CSP, shareholder proposal activism, serves a “signaling” function, driving 
managers to divert resources away from CSP and utilizing them toward maintaining their 
discretion. International conduct, environmental issues, and anti-discrimination were the 
top three most common filled issues. 
Reid and Toffel (2009) drew on the model of social activism and organizational 
change to explore how both public (i.e. Regulatory forces) and private politics (i.e. 
Shareholder activism) influence change in a firm’s practices. The authors argue that both 
shareholder activism and regulatory forces increase a firm’s propensity to align itself with 
the broader societal demand. They also theorize and test a spillover effect through which 
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the effect of private and public actions targeted at a specific firm spillover to other actors 
in an industry. 
Hadani et al. (2015) drew on political market place theory of CPA and signaling 
theory to examine the relationship between shareholder social activism and firm’s use of 
financial and relational CPA. The authors theorize that firms use CPA to influence the 
SEC to omit socially oriented proposals. They show that the combination of financial and 
relational CPA is associated with favorable SEC omission rulings on what will be 
included in the final proxy statement.   
Activist outcomes 
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) suggest that shareholder activists can be 
motivated by a desire express an identity. It has been proposed in the literature that, the 
outcome of shareholder social activism for activist is reinforcement of values and identity 
affirmation (Rowley and Moldoveanu 2003). 
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Table 7. Summary of Literature on Shareholder Social Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Discipline 
 
Period 
 
Activism 
measure 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Contributions 
(Vogel 1983) No 
overarching 
theory 
Management 1970-
1982 
NA NA NA The author examines the trend of socially oriented 
shareholder resolutions between 1970 and 1982 and 
concludes that shareholder activism was greatly 
influenced by sociopolitical, ideological, and 
regulatory climate of the 70s. 
 
(Johnson and 
Greening 
1999) 
Institutional 
theory; 
signaling 
theory 
Management  Institutional 
holdings 
Institutional 
investors: 1) 
pension fund 2) 
investment 
management 
funds (mutual 
funds, banks, 
investment 
banks) 
Corporate social 
performance 
(community 
relations, women 
and minorities, 
employee 
relations, 
environment, 
product quality 
dimensions of 
KLD) 
The authors examined the effect of two main types of 
institutional investors- pension funds and investment 
management funds- and governance-related variables 
on two different dimensions of corporate social 
performance (CSP)— people and product quality 
dimensions. They found that pension fund equity 
holding is positively associated with both dimensions 
of CSP. Unlike investment management funds that 
showed no direct relationship with CSP. Top 
management equity holding was positively associated 
with product quality dimension of CSP and unrelated 
to people dimension. Outside management 
representation was also positively associated with 
both dimensions of CSP. 
  
(Campbell et 
al. 1999) 
 
Descriptive 
study based on 
data 
Finance 1997 
proxy 
season 
NA NA NA The authors focus on the 1997 proxy season, and in a 
descriptive fashion, examine shareholder proposal 
concerning social and corporate governance issues. 
According to the results, religious organizations 
submitted the highest number of proposals followed 
by individual activists. A high proportion of proposals 
filed by individuals are withdrawn. The issue related 
to employment discrimination received the highest 
voting results. 
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Table 7. Summary of Literature on Shareholder Social Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Discipline 
 
Period 
 
Activism 
measure 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Contributions 
 (Rowley and 
Moldoveanu 
2003) 
Social 
movement 
theory; social 
identity theory 
  
Management NA NA NA NA Drawing on interest-based and identity-based 
perspectives, the authors challenge the prevalent 
notion that all stakeholder movements are interest 
based and that mobilization is a function of both 
identity expression/affirmation and interest protection. 
Stakeholder salience theory (Frooman 1999) posits 
that stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency of 
their demands predicts their mobilization. Rowley and 
Moldoveanu (2003) contribute to literature by 
theorizing that these factors only partially predict 
stakeholder mobilization. 
 
(Rehbein et al. 
2004) 
 
Model of 
stakeholder 
group 
action- interest
-based and 
identity-based 
perspective 
 
Business? 1992-
1998 
Number of 
shareholder 
proposals within 
specific 
shareholder-
related categories 
Firm’s 
stakeholder-
related 
performance 
(with respect to 
relevant 
stakeholders) 
Number of 
shareholder 
resolutions  
Examined how shareholder activist choose their 
targets. Results show that activists target poor 
performing corporations with respect to social and 
environmental issues. Firm size— with larger and 
more high-profile firms being subjected to more 
activism— is also another predictor of shareholder 
activism. 
(Monks et al. 
2004)  
Available 
cases; extant 
literature 
Sustainable 
development 
2000- 
2003 
Number and type 
(Corporate 
Governance 
related or CSR 
related or both) 
of proposals 
submitted 
 
Type of 
proposals filed  
Number of 
proposals and 
voting result 
 
 
 
The authors examine the trend of shareholder activism 
and finds that nearly half of the proposals submitted 
between 2000 to 2003 were centered around CSR 
issues and that proposals having both CSR and 
corporate governance angles were more successful at 
garnering votes compared with proposals concerning 
only CSR issues.  
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Table 7. Summary of Literature on Shareholder Social Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Discipline 
 
Period 
 
Activism 
measure 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Contributions 
 (Ryan and 
Schneider 
2002) 
Available 
cases; extant 
literature; 
Portfolio 
theory 
Management -2002 NA Performance 
Expectation 
(financial and 
nonfinancial) 
Shareholder Social 
Activism 
The authors provide an integrative model of twelve 
variables influencing shareholder activists’ propensity 
to engage in activism. Fund size, investment time 
span, focus on social or financial agenda, whether a 
fund has business relationships with a firm beyond 
their investor role, size of shares owned by the fund, 
size of the activists’ portfolio invested in a firm, 
proportion invested in equity, legal restraints, whether 
the fund is defined-benefit or defined-contribution, 
investing style (active vs. passive investing), internal 
or external management, and finally internal vs. 
external proxy voting rights are the theorized factors 
in Ryan and Schneider’s (2002) model to determine 
the level of shareholder activism. 
     
(Tkac 2006) No specific 
theory 
Economics 1992-
2002 
Number of CSR 
oriented 
proposals 
submitted  
NA NA The Author uses data from Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) to study the 11-year trend of 
shareholder activism. Based on the results, the largest 
number of socially oriented proposals were submitted 
by religious organizations and there was an increasing 
trend of proposals submitted by socially responsible 
(SR) funds. 
  
(Proffitt and 
Spicer 2006) 
Social 
movement 
perspective 
Management 1973- 
2003 
Number of 
proposals 
NA Number and type 
of social issue of 
proposals 
Examines 35-years trend of social shareholder 
activism. Finds that religious organizations set the 
agenda and legitimized shareholder social activism 
and were subsequently followed by pension funds. 
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Table 7. Summary of Literature on Shareholder Social Activism 
 
 
Author(s) 
 
Theory 
 
Discipline 
 
Period 
 
Activism 
measure 
 
IVs 
 
DVs 
 
Contributions 
(David et al. 
2007) 
 
Shareholder 
salience 
theory  
 
Management 1992-
1998 
 
Proposals 
concerning social 
issues 
Shareholder 
salience 
(criteria of 
power, 
legitimacy, and 
urgency); 
Shareholder 
proposal 
activism 
 
Responsiveness to 
shareholder 
proposal activism; 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
 
Show that shareholder proposal activism is negatively 
related to corporate social performance (CSP). They 
suggest that rather than having a “disciplining” 
function and increasing subsequent CSP, shareholder 
proposal activism, serves a “signaling” function, 
driving managers to divert resources away from CSP 
and utilizing them toward maintaining their 
discretion. International conduct, environmental 
issues, and anti-discrimination were the top three most 
common filled issues. 
 
(Sjöström 
2008) 
Literature on 
Shareholder 
social activism 
Business 
strategy 
1983- 
2007 
Number of 
proposals 
NA NA The author reviews and synthesizes the body of 
research on social shareholder activism between 1983 
and 2007. Based on the review missing perspectives 
and directions for future research are identified. 
 
 
(Reid and 
Toffel 2009) 
The model of 
social activism 
and 
organizational 
change 
Firm and 
market 
 Number of 
proposals 
Shareholder 
resolutions on 
environmental-
related issues 
Firm’s decision 
about adopting 
public disclosures 
Explore how both public (i.e. Regulatory forces) and 
private politics (i.e. Shareholder activism) influence 
change in a firm’s practices. The authors argue that 
both shareholder activism and regulatory forces 
increase a firm’s propensity to align itself with the 
broader societal demand. They also theorize and test a 
spillover effect through which the effect of private 
and public actions targeted at a specific firm spillover 
to other actors in an industry. 
 
(Hadani et al. 
2016) 
Political 
marketplace 
theory of 
CPA; and 
signaling 
theory 
Management 1999-
2006 
Shareholder 
resolutions 
concerning social 
and 
environmental 
issues 
Financial CPA; 
Relational CPA 
SEC rule on 
omission of a 
proposal from the 
final proxy 
statement 
The authors theorize that firms use CPA to influence 
SEC to omit socially oriented proposals. They show 
that the combination of financial and relational CPA 
is associated with favorable SEC omission rulings on 
what will be included in the final proxy statement.   
 
 
73 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
In the following chapter I draw from the reviewed literature on CSR and CPA, as 
well as upper echelons and moral foundation theories to develop hypotheses that explore 
the consequences of a CEO’s action to take a stand on a social-political issue on his/her 
respective firm’s CSR and CPA and subsequently the firm’s sales growth. The 
conceptual model is shown in Figure 5. As illustrated, I propose that CEO activism, 
measured by the number of times a CEO takes a stand on a social-political issue, is 
related to his/her respective firm’s advances in corporate social responsibility (CSR) as 
well as the firm’s corporate political activity (CPA) and that CSR and CPA are related to 
the firm’s sales growth. I further theorize that the CEO’s political ideology, measured by 
the CEO’s political donations prior tenure, moderates the relationship among CEO 
activism, CSR, and CPA. 
I begin by introducing the concepts of CEO activism and CEO’s political 
ideology. I then draw on upper echelon’s theory and related literature on political 
ideology and CEO activism to explain the theoretical underpinnings of my hypotheses. 
Table 8 shows the construct names and definitions
 
 
74 
Figure 5. Proposed Conceptual Model 
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Table 8. Definitions of Key Constructs 
 
Construct 
  
Definition Example studies 
CEO Activism 
 
When a CEO communicates his/her stand on social-political issues not directly 
related to their core business. 
  
(Chatterji and Toffel 
2017) 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the 
firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams and Siegel 2001, p. 117) 
(Chin et al. 2013; Gupta et 
al. 2017) 
Corporate Political 
Activity (CPA) 
 
Corporate attempts to influence government policy or process in ways 
favorable to the firm. 
(Getz 1997; Hillman et al. 
2004; Lux et al. 2011) 
CEO Political 
Ideology  
“the term ‘political ideology’ is normally defined as an interrelated set of 
attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be 
achieved” (Tedin 1987, p. 65). I use CEO political ideology as a relatively 
stable and enduring personal inclination of the CEO that reflects his/her 
underlying personal values. 
 
(Chin et al. 2013; Jost 
2006; Unsal et al. 2016) 
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CEO Activism 
CEOs, more than ever, are taking a stand on controversial social and political 
issues. Polls have shown that the majority of customers base their purchase or boycott 
decisions on a firm’s political stand on a controversial issue (WeberShandwick 2018). 
These polls indicate that ideology dominates consumer’s purchase decisions. For 
example, the 2017 Edelman Earned Brand survey3 shows that 60% of the millennials 
purchase decisions and 50% of all consumers’ are “belief-driven”. An illustrative 
example is Keurig’s customer backlash. After Keurig’s tweet announcing that it would 
pull ads from Sean Hannity’s Fox News show for siding with a then-political candidate 
accused of sexual abuse, videos of users breaking their Keurig’s coffee machines surged 
to the internet. This event is illustrative of how consumers act out their reactions to firm’s 
stances on controversial issues through consumer products—a phenomena, Crouch 
(2017, The New Yorker) calls “politicization of American junk”.
There are both rewards and risks for the firms of the CEOs who take a stand on a 
controversial issue. The rewards accrue to firms from those customers who share the 
CEO viewpoint. The risks incur to firms from those customers who oppose the CEO’s 
stance (WeberShandwick 2018; Weinzimmer and Esken 2016). 
In the dawn of corporate political activism, investigating this phenomenon is 
timely. In 2016-2018 research agenda, the Marketing Science Institute listed the question 
“should brands take stands? What is marketing’s role as a driver/enabler of social 
change?” as a “critical issue emerging in the not-too-distant future”4. 
                                               
3 See https://www.edelman.com/earned-brand/.   
4 See http://www.msi.org/research/2016-2018-research-priorities/on-the-horizon-seven-
questions-to-ponder/. 
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In the literature, the concept of businesses taking a stand on controversial social or 
political issues has been given different names including corporate social advocacy 
(Dodd and Supa 2014a), corporate political activism (Clemensen 2017; Korschun et al. 
2017), and CEO activism (Chatterji and Toffel 2015b). For a summary of the constructs 
and definitions, see Table 9.  
In the words of Dodd and Supa (2014a), corporate social advocacy refers to “ an 
organization making a public statement or taking a public stance on social-political 
issues” (p. 5). Clemensen (2017) refers to corporate political activism as “when a 
company acts in response to controversial political topics” (p. 13). The author considers 
corporate political activism as part of a firm’s CSR. Chatterji and Toffel (2017) define 
CEO activism as when “corporate leaders seek to influence social issues not directly 
related to their core business” (p. 1).  
This concept has been introduced to the literature recently and there is not much 
consensus on its limits. For example, Chatterji and Toffel (2017) view CEO activism 
distinct from nonmarket strategy and its elements—CPA and CSR. CPA includes firm’s 
efforts to influence public policy in a way that contributes to the firm’s bottom line. They 
refer to actions to secure favorable policy regulation such as lobbying, as “narrow 
efforts”. Similarly, the authors argue that CSR has a dual objective of “doing well while 
doing good”, meaning it is profit-motivated. On the other hand, CEO activism addresses 
much broader societal issues without being obviously profit-motivated. Unlike CPA, 
CEO activism is “transparent” and “highly visible”. In summary, they view CEO 
activism as a counterpoint to CPA and ultimately nonmarket strategy. 
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In a recent Harvard Business Review article, Chatterji and Toffel (2018), drawing 
on anecdotal evidence, suggest that there are two main tactics of CEO activists, raising 
awareness and leveraging economic power. Raising awareness involves activities such as 
issuing a statement or tweet and writing an op-ed. Leveraging economic power involves 
“putting economic pressure on states to reject or overturn legislation” (Chatterji and 
Toffel 2018). This tactic is similar to using market actions such as mergers and 
acquisition and moving headquarters out of the state, to influence the nonmarket 
environment and gain policy advantage (Funk and Hirschman 2017). However, one 
difference may be that in the case of market actions as means of gaining policy 
advantage, the motive is dominantly economic with the goal of contributing to the bottom 
line.   
CEO activism is an emerging phenomenon and expectedly empirical evidence of 
its antecedents and outcomes are limited. In terms of method, experiments have mostly 
been used to study CEO activism (Chatterji and Toffel 2017; Dodd and Supa 2015). See 
Table 10 for a summary of the few papers on CEO activism.   
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Table 9. Concept of a Firm Taking a Stand on Controversial Issues 
Author (s) Construct name Definition 
 
Dodd and 
Supa (2015, p. 
387) 
Corporate social advocacy “taking of a public stance on a 
controversial social-political issue by 
corporations, most often in the form of a 
CEO statement” 
 
Clemensen 
(2017, p. 13) 
Corporate political 
activism 
“when a company acts in response to 
controversial political topics” 
 
Korschun et 
al. (2016, p. 2) 
Corporate political 
activism 
“a public position taken by an 
organization or its executives on a 
divisive political issue, election, or 
government legislation” 
 
Chatterji and 
Toffel (2017, 
p. 1) 
CEO activism “where corporate leaders seek to 
influence social issues not directly 
related to their core business” 
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Table 10. Summary of the Literature on CEO Activism 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Theory 
 
IV(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Activism 
Measures 
 
Contributions 
Dodd and Supa (2015; 
2014b) 
 
Theory of planned 
behavior as the 
underpinning of 
purchase intention 
 
CEO 
statement on 
a social-
political 
issue; 
Attitude 
toward 
social-
political 
issues. 
 
Purchase 
intention 
CEO 
statement  
Using an experiment, the authors find that consumer’s agreement with 
a corporate stance is positively related to their purchase intentions.  
Weinzimmer and 
Esken (2016) 
 
No overarching 
theory 
NA NA NA The authors evaluate the effect of firm’s executives taking a stand on 
what they call “sensitive social issues”. The benefit is gaining support 
of those customers who agree with the firm’s political position and 
the downside is alienating those who disagree. The authors conclude 
that the long-term benefits that firms accrue from being politically 
involved, outweighs its risks. That is in the long-run firms benefit 
from taking a stand. The authors argue that how a company takes a 
stand influences subsequent outcomes. For example, directly 
addressing the issue elicits outcomes that are more positive for the 
firm. The authors make normative suggestions to business leaders 
regarding taking a stand on sensitive issues. First, business leaders 
should balance their fiduciary duties and social activism by aligning 
their stand with their business context. Second, they must regard their 
stand as a strategic action. Lastly, they must heed the legal 
ramifications of their stand and make sure that it is not in conflict with 
the law. 
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Author(s) 
 
 
Theory 
 
IV(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Activism 
Measures 
 
Contributions 
(Chatterji and Toffel 
2017) 
Policy lifecycle 
stages—initiation, 
early adoption, 
diffusion, and 
standardization. 
The authors view 
CEO activism 
happening in the 
early adoption and 
diffusion stages. 
   
Support for 
a 
controversial 
policy 
(RFRA) 
Purchase 
intention;  
CEO 
statement on 
a 
controversial 
policy 
Using two field experiments, the authors examine the influence of a 
CEO’s political and social stands on public’ attitudes and purchase 
intentions. In the first study, they find Apple CEO’s views on a 
controversial policy decreased public support for the law and 
positively influenced consumers’ purchase intentions particularly 
among those who shared the same viewpoint.  
In the second study, the result is divergent from the first study’s 
result. The authors do not find support for the effect of a group of 
unnamed CEOs on public opinion of a climate change policy, 
regardless of how the issue is framed.  
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CEO Political Ideology 
We know that corporate executives do not operate without constraints (e.g., 
Lieberson and O'Connor 1972). However, they often have a considerable degree of 
discretion in their decisions (Phillips et al. 2010). According to the upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984), organizational outcomes—strategic decisions and 
performance—are driven by executive’s background characteristics. Executives’ 
experiences, personalities, and values, including their political ideologies, can therefore 
determine strategic choices and organizational outcomes (Finkelstein 2009). 
According to upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984) a manager’s 
characteristics and background predict organizational outcomes including strategic 
decisions and firm performance. Based on the theory, heterogeneity in outcomes and 
strategic decisions of companies is due to the differences in corporate leaders concerning 
their experiences, personalities, and personal values. The bulk of the empirical tests of the 
upper echelons theory focuses on the effect of CEOs’ experiences (Miller and Shamsie 
2001) and personalities (Chen et al. 2015a; Peterson et al. 2003) on their decision 
making. Fewer researchers have examined the effect of CEO’s values on their decisions 
(Agle et al. 1999; Simsek et al. 2005).    
Based on the political science and political psychology literatures, executive’s 
political ideologies reflect their values (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Goren et al. 2009; 
Rosenberg 1956). Ideology as a belief system of the individual has been defined in 
different ways, with “stability” and “organization” being the common key features in all 
the definitions (Jost 2006). Some scholars have defined political ideology in terms of 
values. For example, as Tedin (1987) defines it, “The term ‘political ideology’ is 
 
 
83 
normally defined as an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of 
society and how they should be achieved…” (p. 65). The relationship between values and 
political ideology has been studied and many scholars have contended that individual’s 
political ideology reflects his/her values (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Layman 1997; 
Rosenberg 1956). In other words, values are manifested in individuals’ political 
ideologies (Feldman 2003).  
In political science, ideology is often treated as a “relatively stable and coherent 
(or constrained) belief system within the mind of an individual” (Jost 2006, p. 652). As 
such, ideology is an “internally consistent and stable belief system” (Jost 2006, p. 652). 
The left-right distinction (or in the U.S. liberalism-conservatism) of political 
ideology is the most used classification of political ideology (Jost 2006). As Jost (2006, 
p. 654) noted: the left-right distinction “has been the single most useful and parsimonious 
way to classify political attitudes for more than 200 years”. The spatial metaphor of left-
right may be traced back to the French parliament seating arrangements in 18th century 
(Jost 2006).  
Scholars have shown that there are significant differences between liberals and 
conservatives concerning their beliefs and values. Hence, studying liberal-conservative 
spectrum substantially helps us understand individual’s core beliefs and values  
(Schwartz 2016). The core issues that shape the most meaningful and most consistent 
differences between liberals and conservatives concern “attitude toward social change 
versus tradition ” and “attitudes toward inequality” (Jost 2006, p. 654). According to Jost 
and his colleagues (Jost et al. 2003; Jost 2006), individuals who identify as conservatives 
are more resistant to change and place more emphasis on order, stability, maintaining the 
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status quo, respect for conventional authority figures, and traditional “family values”. 
They also value property rights, free market, and business needs. On the other hand, 
individuals who identify as liberals are more sensitive to social issues including diversity, 
minority rights, and social change. They place a higher priority on social justice, 
economic equality, and control over markets.  
Researchers in strategic management and political science fields have long 
studied the political actions of corporations and its effect on the market and nonmarket 
environments (Hillman et al. 2004; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988). Recently, there has been 
a growing interest in the influence of corporate executives’ political orientations, as 
distinct from the corporation’s political agenda (e.g., Briscoe et al. 2014; Chin et al. 
2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Elnahas and Kim 2017; Francia et al. 2005; Hutton 
et al. 2014; Tetlock 2000; Unsal et al. 2016). For example, Democrat-leaning CEOs are 
found to make more CSR advances (Chin et al. 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) 
and Republican-leaning CEOs are found to implement more financially conservative 
policies (Hutton et al. 2014). 
Researchers have attempted to investigate the relationship between CEOs political 
leanings on a firm’s CSR engagement (Chin et al. 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) 
and the employee’s engagement in activism (Briscoe et al. 2014). See Table 11 for a 
summary of the results. For example, Chin et al. (2013) draw on upper echelons theory to 
theorize the relationship between a CEO’s political ideology and the firm’s CSR ratings. 
The authors show that CEO’s political liberalism is positively associated with the 
intensity of CSR. Moreover, they show that CEO’s political ideology influences their 
firm’s PAC contributions. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) draw on CSR literature to test 
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the “direct value” theory of CSR which posits that CSR “can provide direct value to firm 
stakeholders even if it is financially costly” (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014, p. 159). The 
authors explore the relationship between political affiliation of a firm’s executives 
(founders, CEO, and directors) and CSR ratings measured through KLD. They find that 
democratic leadership and having headquarters in the blue states is associated with higher 
CSR scores compared with republican leadership and headquarters located in the red 
states. The authors also find that CSR expenditures is negatively associated with firm 
value measured by future stock returns and ROA. The researchers suggest that the CSR’s 
benefits to a group of stakeholders occurs at the cost of the firm’s value.  
CEO’s political ideology is found to influence the firm’s engagement in CPA 
(Chin et al. 2013; Coates 2012; Milyo et al. 2000). CEO political ideology has also been 
found to influence their firm’s investment decisions, specifically mergers and 
acquisitions decisions (Elnahas and Kim 2017). The authors find that Republican CEOs 
are significantly less likely to undertake mergers and acquisitions activities. 
Unsal et al. (2016) find support that CEO political orientation—measured by 
manager’s personal PAC financial contributions to both parties during elections—   
influences corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, the authors show that Republican-
leaning managers lobby a larger number of bills and expend more on lobbying compared 
to their Democratic-leaning and Apolitical counterparts. Researchers have also found that 
CEOs have a significant influence on corporate donations to PACs (Coates 2012; Milyo 
et al. 2000). Moreover, CEO political liberalism is found to be significantly positively 
related to the company’s PAC Democratic orientation (Chin et al. 2013). PAC 
Democratic orientation is measured by an annual average of three indicators: “the number 
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of company PAC donations to Democrats divided by the number of donations to 
recipients in both parties, the dollar amount of company PAC donations to Democrats 
divided by the dollars given to both parties, and the number of distinct Democratic 
recipients divided by the number of recipients in both parties” (Chin et al. 2013, p. 217-
218). In other words, liberal-leaning firms donate more to Democratic PACs.  
Firms that have Republican-leaning CEOs are on average larger in market size, 
have higher ROA, have lower corporate debt and more leverage, possess more tangible 
assets, and make less risky investments (Hutton et al. 2014). Researchers have found a 
significant difference between firms that have Republican leaning CEOs compared with 
their counterparts in terms of lobbying efforts (Unsal et al. 2016). Specifically, 
Republican leaning firms hire more lobbyists including more former congressmen, have 
higher lobbying expenditures and lobby a larger number of bills including more than one 
issue in both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representative. As a result, a greater 
number of bills in favor of the Republican firms are passed in the aforementioned U.S. 
legislative institutions and ultimately become law (Unsal et al. 2016). 
According to the above and consistent with previous research (e.g., Chin et al. 
2013; Hutton et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2014), I treat and use the concept of CEO political 
ideology as relatively stable and enduring personal inclination of the CEO that reflects 
their underlying personal values. I further argue that the CEOs’ political ideology 
influences the relationship between CEO activism and corporate political activity as well 
as the relationship between CEO activism and corporate social responsibility.  
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Table 11. Literature on CEO Political Ideology and CSR 
 
Author(s) 
 
 
Theory 
 
IV(s) 
 
DV(s) 
 
Contributions 
Chin et al. (2013) Echelons theory 
(executives incorporate 
their personal beliefs 
and values in their 
strategic decisions) 
 
CEO political 
liberalism 
Firm’s annual CSR 
profile (KLD ratings) 
Show that CEO’s political ideologies influence the 
intensity of CSR. Moreover, CEO’s political 
ideology influences their firm’s PAC contributions. 
 
Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) 
CSR literature- test the 
“direct value” theory of 
CSR—“CSR can 
provide direct value to 
firm stakeholders even 
if it is financially 
costly.” 
Firm political 
affiliation; having a 
firm headquarter in 
republican-leaning or 
democratic-leaning 
states 
 
CSR ratings (KLD 
scores) 
Explore the relationship between political affiliation 
of a firm’s executives (founders, CEOs, and 
directors) and CSR ratings measured through KLD. 
The authors find that democratic leadership and 
having headquarters in blue states is associated with 
higher CSR scores compared with republican 
leadership and headquarters in red states. The 
authors also find that higher CSR expenditures are 
not associated with higher sales. In fact, CSR 
expenditures is negatively associated with firm 
value measured by future stock returns and ROA.  
     
Briscoe et al. (2014) Corporate opportunity 
structure—with the 
tenant that contextual 
factors play a critical 
role in predicting the 
occurrence and its 
success likelihood.  
CEO liberalism 
(measured through 
political donations); 
Moderators: CEO 
power, workplace 
conservatism, 
expansion of the 
movement. 
 
Employees’ 
engagement in activism 
measured through 
formation of corporate 
LGBT groups in the 
period 1985-2004.  
Theorize that political ideology of the firm’s CEO 
influences employee’s tendency to engage in 
activism. They find evidence that CEO’s political 
liberalism is associated with more employee 
activism and that this relationship is stronger when 
the CEO is more powerful, the workplace 
environment is more conservative, and the social 
movement has not diffused greatly.  
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CEO Activism and CSR 
CSR is defined as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the 
interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams and Siegel 2001, p. 
117). CSR is an umbrella term that includes a variety of organizational practices and 
operations that are intended to serve multiple stakeholders, beyond firm’s owners,  
including customers, employees, interest groups, communities, and society at large (Chin 
et al. 2013). Many scholars emphasize that CSR actions must be discretionary (e.g., 
Aguilera et al. 2007; Mackey et al. 2007).   
According to upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984) a manager’s 
characteristics and background predict organizational outcomes including strategic 
decisions and firm performance. Adopting the logic of upper echelons theory (Hambrick 
and Mason 1984), I predict that as the number of times a CEO communicates his/her 
stand on social-political issues— not directly related to their core business— increases,  
the firm will have higher advances in CSR and hence a higher CSR rating. As discussed 
earlier, CEO activism is the manifestation of the CEOs underlying values and beliefs. 
According to the upper echelons theory, CEOs incorporate their values and beliefs into 
their strategic decision.  
There are two mechanisms through which the CEO’s values enter his/her decision 
making (England 1967; Finkelstein 2009). The first mechanism is referred to as 
“behavior channeling” (England 1967). Through behavior channeling, values may have a 
direct effect on the CEO’s choices. After considering facts, probabilities, consequences, 
and alternatives, the CEO selects a course of action that fits his or her values.   
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The second mechanism is referred to as “perceptual filtering” (England 1967). 
Through perceptual filtering, values may have an indirect effect on the CEO’s choices. 
Under perceptual filtering, the CEO selectively searches for information that fits his or 
her values and perceives and interprets information is a value-congruent fashion. This is a 
far more prevalent conduit for values to enter CEOs choices than behavior channeling 
(Chin et al. 2013). 
According to my adopted definition of CEO activism, CEO activism occurs when 
a CEO takes a side on a social-political issue, not directly related to their core business. 
The increase in the intensity of CEO activism is reflective of a socially concerned and 
aware CEO. In other words, CEO activism indicates that the CEO activist is more 
sensitive to social-political issues. Based on this, activist CEOs are more likely to 
interpret a business case for boosting the firm’s CSR. In other words, CEO activism is 
associated with CEO’s perceptions of the business case for CSR through perceptual 
filtering, as well as their preferences for the outcomes of CSR through behavior 
channeling. That is, as a CEO’s instances of taking a side on a social-political issue 
increases, so does his or her perceptions that CSR is beneficial for the firm’s stakeholders 
(perceptual filtering). Convinced that CSR is desirable, in the role of the chief director of 
the company policies and practices, the CEOs will advance CSR—fortifying their firm’s 
CSR strengths and excluding concerns about CSR. Thus, I expect that CEO activism will 
positively influence the firm’s advances in CSR.  
H1: CEO activism will have a positive association with the firm’s CSR score. 
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CEO Activism and CPA 
As discussed earlier, CEO activism is when a CEO seeks to influence issues not 
directly related to their core business by taking a public stance on a controversial social-
political issue (Chatterji and Toffel 2018; Chatterji and Toffel 2015a). CEO activism is a 
burgeoning phenomenon. It has been introduced in the literature recently and expectedly 
empirical evidence of its outcomes are limited. The few research studies conducted in this 
area show that CEO activism may shape public policy by shaping public opinions of the 
policies as well as influencing public policy directly through leveraging economic power 
and putting pressure on states to pass or overturn a legislation (Chatterji and Toffel 2017; 
2018). CEO activism has also been found to affect consumer purchase intentions (Dodd 
and Supa 2015; Dodd and Supa 2014b), particularly among those who share the CEO’s 
viewpoint (Chatterji and Toffel 2017). Korschun et al. (2017) argue that corporation’s 
public positions on controversial political issues influences the corporation’s 
relationships with its key constituents, specifically its employees. The authors theorize 
that the (mis)alignment of the public position taken by the organization has implications 
for how the employees view the self in relations to others and that this social comparison 
influences how they manage their identity and behavioral outcomes.  
 What is missing from our knowledge about CEO activism is its relationship with 
corporate political engagement through activities such as lobbying and PAC 
contributions. Drawing on the upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984), I 
argue that CEO activism, as measured by the number of times a CEO makes a statement 
indicating its position on a controversial social-political issue, is related to firm’s 
engagement in political activities.    
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Based on published research, we know that there are both risks and rewards 
associated with CEO activism (Weinzimmer and Esken 2016). Risks incur to firms from 
the stakeholder group who do not share the CEO’s view point and reward accrue to firms 
from those who share the CEOs viewpoint (Chatterji and Toffel 2017). The two main 
tactics of CEO activists is to raise awareness and to leverage their economic power. 
(Chatterji and Toffel 2018). Through leveraging the economic powers, corporations put 
pressure on states to reject or overturn legislation (Chatterji and Toffel 2018). For 
example, a case of CEO activism may involve punishing states by canceling planned 
expansion to the state’s territory, threatening to stop all salesforce employees travel to the 
state, threatening to move the headquarters out of the state, and canceling plans of 
establishing operation centers in the state that would potentially create considerable 
number of jobs. CEO activism might also involve donating to third-party groups that 
promote their stand (Chatterji and Toffel 2018).  
Based on the above, there is a clear relationship between CEO activism and CPA. 
CEO activism involves activities that leverage the firm’s economic power to influence 
public policy and CPA includes firm’s deliberate attempts to influence the public policy 
in a way that is favorable to the firm and contributes the firm’s bottom line (Getz 1997; 
Hillman et al. 2004). As a CEOs activism level increases, he or she is more likely to 
increase CPA to influence the public policy. Therefore, as the number of times a CEO 
takes a position on social-political issues increases, his or her firm’s aggregate lobbying 
and PAC expenditures also increase. Thus, based on the above, I hypothesize:  
H2: CEO activism will have a positive association with the firm’s CPA.  
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The Moderating Effect Hypotheses  
As argued previously, CEO activism influences the firm’s CSR. The higher CEO 
activism, measured by the number of times they communicate their stand on a social-
political issue, the more the firm’s advances in CSR. This is because CEO activism as the 
manifestation of the underlying values and beliefs of the CEO influences the CEO to 
project a business case for the CSR (perceptual filtering) and hence increases their 
tendency to invest in CSR activities. We know from published research that the political 
orientation of the CEOs influence their firm-level decision making processes as well as 
the firm performance (e.g., Hutton et al. 2014; Unsal et al. 2016). For example, firms of 
Democratic CEOs are more socially responsible (Briscoe et al. 2014; Chin et al. 2013; Di 
Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) and firms of Republican CEOs are less socially responsive 
(Sturdivant et al. 1985), make less risky investments (Elnahas and Kim 2017; Hutton et 
al. 2014) and have higher profitability (Hutton et al. 2014). I argue that the effect of CEO 
activism on CSR varies across  CEO’s political ideology orientation.  
Researchers contend that liberals and conservatives differ in terms of their 
personalities. Liberal individuals are on average more open to experience, more sensitive 
to social issues, have a tendency to seek changes and novelty both personally and 
politically (Jost et al. 2008; McCrae 1996). Conservative individuals, on the other hand, 
show a strong disposition to maintaining the status quo as well as respect for authority 
(Jost et al. 2003; Jost et al. 2008).  
According to moral foundation theory (Haidt and Graham 2007), there are five 
psychological foundations of morality. They lable these five foundations harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. “Cultures then 
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vary in the degree to which they construct, value, and teach virtues based on the five 
intuitive foundations” (Haidt and Graham 2007, p. 104).  
The harm/care moral foundation is based on the evolutionary human tendency to 
be sensitive to cruelty and harm. Because of this, individuals have approval for those who 
prevent or alleviate harm, and disapproval toward those who inflict harm. The approval is 
culturally codified in virtues such as kindness and compassion. Cruelty and agression are 
examples of the corresponding vices.The fairness/reciprocity is about virtues related to 
fairness and justice. Graham et al. (2009) refer to these two foundations as 
individualizing foundations because “they are (we suggest) the source of the intutions 
that make the liberal philosophical tradition, with its emphasis on the rights and welfare 
of individuals, so learnable and so compelling to so many people” (Graham et al. 2009, p. 
1031). The ingroup/loyalty foundation reflects virtues such as loyalty, patriotisim, and 
heroism and the corresponding vices such as betrayal and treason. The authority/respect 
moral foundation concerns virtues related to good leadership, often involving 
magnanimity, fatherliness, and wisdom. Lastly, the purity/sanctity foundation relates to 
“a set of virtues and vices linked to bodily activities in general, and religious activities in 
particular” (Haidt and Graham 2007, p. 106). Graham et al. (2009) refer to the last three 
moral foundations as the binding foundations, because “they are (we suggest) the source 
of the intuitions that make many conservative and religious moralities, with their 
emphasis on group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control, so learnable and so compelling 
to so many people” (Graham et al. 2009, p. 1031). 
These five moral foundations provide “a taxonomy for the bases of moral 
judgments, intuitions, concerns” (Graham et al. 2009, p. 1040). Haidt and Graham’s 
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(2007) idea was based on “that moral intuitions derive from innate pscychological 
mechanisms that coevolved with cultural institutions and practices”. Therefore, to 
develop the said taxonomy, the authors searched for “the best links between 
anthropological and evolutionary accounts of morality” (Haidt and Graham 2007, p. 
1030).  
Graham et al. (2009) applied moral foundation theory to moral differences 
between liberal- and conservative-leaning individuals in the U.S. According to the theory, 
“Political liberals construct their moral systems primarily upon two psychological 
foundations—Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity—whereas political conservatives 
construct moral systems more evenly upon five psychological foundations—the same 
ones as liberals, plus Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity” (Graham et 
al. 2009, p. 1029). They refer to it as the moral foundation hypothesis and across four 
studies, using multiple methods, show support for it. The test of theory suggests that 
variation in liberals and conservatives’ moral values, judgments, arguments, and behavior 
is due to different configuration of the five foundations. The four studies Graham et al. 
(2009) conducted, indicate that liberals’ morality is primarily focused on harm and 
fairness, whereas conservatives’ morality concerns are equally distributed across the five 
moral foundations (p.1040).  
For conservative-leaning CEOs, the effect of different levels of CEO activism on 
CSR will not be different compared with the liberal CEOs, all else equal. This prediction 
is based on the moral foundation hypothesis (Graham et al. 2009) as well as the findings 
of the researchers who demonstrate that conservative CEOs apply financially 
conservative policies (Hutton et al. 2014). Firms with conservative CEOs are known to 
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have less debt, make less risky investment decisions, lower capital and research and 
development (R&D) expenditures, higher dividend payouts, and higher profitability 
(Hutton et al. 2014). Firm investment decisions also vary depending on the CEO’s 
political ideology. For example, researchers suggest that conservative CEOs are less 
likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) activities compared with liberal 
CEOs (Elnahas and Kim 2017). Overall, conservative CEOs apply more financially 
conservative policies, demonstrate a strong disposition to preserve the status quo, and are 
less likely to engage in sensation-seeking behavior. CSR advances require resource 
allocation and its positive firm outcomes are not visible in the short term. Increasing 
investment in CSR activities is antithesis of maintaining the status quo and avoiding risky 
investment. Based on this logic, I predict that conservative CEOs (compared with liberal 
CEOs) will not increase their company’s advances in CSR as their level of activism 
increases.  
For liberal-leaning CEOs, I predict that CEO activism will have a diminishingly 
positive effect on the firm’s advances in CSR. This effect is the most positive at lower 
levels of CEO activism and weakens as CEOs increase the number of times they take a 
stand on social-political issues. From published research, we know that liberal CEOs 
apply more socially responsible policies (Briscoe et al. 2014; Chin et al. 2013; Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky 2014). As discussed earlier, CEO activism reflects the CEO’s 
underlying values and political convictions. As liberal CEOs engage in more activism, 
they tend to perceive a business case for CSR and grow a strong preference for CSR 
outcomes. As a result, they envision that CSR is beneficial for the firms and hold that 
CSR is intrinsically desirable. This will influence the CEO to apply socially responsible 
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policies and practices and hence their activism will have a growing positive effect on the 
firm’s CSR, however up to a certain point.  
While I suggest that higher CEO activism levels improves the firm’s CSR, there is 
one consequential reason this positive effect will reach a point of diminishing returns. 
According to research in resource allocation (Klingebiel and Rammer 2014) as the 
breadth of resource allocation increases, the focus and thrust gets limited, hence resources 
for the task at hand will not be sufficient. Consistently, as CEO activism gains more 
breadth, the resources such as time, energy, capital and other resources become more 
limited, hence the weaker association between CEO activism and the firm’s CSR. In this 
case, the CEO will not be able to give intense focus to implementing policies and 
practices directed at improving the CSR and as a result have lower levels of focus on 
CSR.  
Based on the above, all else constant, for liberal CEOs, higher levels of CEO 
activism likely return higher CSR ratings, at a certain point engaging in CEO activism 
will result in diminishing CSR ratings for the corresponding increases in CEO activism. 
See Figure 6 for the predicted interaction effect of CEO political ideology and CEO 
activism on the firm CSR. Based on the above discussion, I hypothesize the following: 
H3: CEO’s political ideology (liberalism vs. conservatism) moderates the 
relationship between CEO activism and the firm’s CSR. All else equal, for liberal-leaning 
CEOs, CEO activism will have a diminishingly positive association with firm’s advances 
in CSR; the relationship is most positive at lower levels of CEO activism but weakens at 
high levels of CEO activism. For conservative-leaning CEOs, CEO activism will not have 
a significant effect on the firm’s CSR.  
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Figure 6. Predicted Interaction Effect on CSR 
 
Earlier, as the baseline hypothesis, I argued that the number of times a CEO 
expresses his/her side on a controversial issue is positively related to the CEO’s firm 
engagement in political activities. We know that two of the tactics CEO activists use to 
influence public policy are raising awareness and leveraging economic power. 
Leveraging economic power includes activities such as threatening to move the 
headquarters out of the state and donating to third-parties who advocate the CEO’s stand. 
Such actions have an association with firm’s engagement in political activities mainly 
lobbying and donations to PACs. 
The effect of CEO activism on CPA is a baseline effect meaning that on average 
across all firms, CEO activism is positively related to CPA. However, I argue that the 
effect of CEO activism on CPA varies across firms with CEOs that have conservative- 
versus liberal-leaning political ideologies. Specifically, I predict that CEO engagement in 
CSR
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more activism—measured by the number of times they take a side on social-political 
issues— will significantly increase the firm spending on CPA for firms with liberal-
leaning CEOs compared with conservative-leaning CEOs.   
Researchers have found that CEOs have a significant influence on corporate 
donations to PACs (Coates 2012; Milyo et al. 2000). For example, CEO political 
liberalism is found to be significantly positively related to the company’s PAC 
Democratic orientation (Chin et al. 2013). Published research shows the Republican-
leaning managers lobby a larger number of bills, hire more lobbyists, and expend more 
on lobbying compared to their Democratic-leaning and Apolitical counterparts (Unsal et 
al. 2016).   
We know that one of the fundamental differences between liberals and 
conservatives is resistance to change (Jost et al. 2003; Jost 2006; Sturdivant et al. 1985). 
Liberalism is characterized by preferring new things, being receptive to change or 
innovation, and stimulus seeking (Sturdivant et al. 1985). Published research also shows 
that liberals are more sensitive to social issues and that they place a higher priority on 
social justice (Jost 2006). For liberal-leaning CEOs, engagement in CEO activism—
measured by the number of times they communicate their stand on a social-political 
issue—induces them to enact corporate political activity policies that are aligned with 
their political convictions and this will increase their respective firm’s CPA expenditure.  
On the other hand, the effect of CEO activism on CPA will not be significantly 
higher for conservative-leaning CEOs. As discussed earlier, conservatives have a 
disposition toward maintaining the status quo and place a higher priority on free market 
and business needs (Jost et al. 2003; Jost 2006). Conservative CEOs also apply more 
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financially conservative policies (Hutton et al. 2014). Based on this, it is unlikely that the 
number of times they engage in activism, will significantly influence their already-in-
place optimal financial policies regarding their respective firm’s CPA. 
As a result, the CPA expenditure of the firms with liberal-leaning CEOs increases 
to a greater extent compared with the CPA expenditure of the firms with conservative-
leaning CEOs. Figure 7 illustrates the predicted interaction effect of CEO activism and 
CEO political ideology on firm’s CPA. Based on the above, I hypothesize the following:  
H4: CEO’s political ideology (liberalism vs. conservatism) moderates the 
relationship between CEO activism and the firm’s CPA. All else equal, for liberal-
leaning CEOs, CEO activism will have a positive association with firm’s advances in 
CPA. For conservative-leaning CEOs, CEO activism will not have a significant effect on 
the firm’s CPA. 
Figure 7. Predicted Interaction Effect on CPA 
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CSR and Sales Growth 
Two of the early empirical works on the firm effect of CSR include Brown and 
Dacin’s (1997) and Sen and Bhattacharya’s (2001) papers. Brown and Dacin’s (1997) 
investigated the effect of firm’s CSR associations on new product evaluations. They find 
that CSR associations influence product evaluations through corporate evaluations. 
Building on this paper, Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) also investigated the effect of CSR 
on company evaluations and show that this relationship is mediated by customer’s self-
congruence with the company and moderated by the customer’s support for the CSR 
domain. In both papers, the authors use the broad societal conceptualization of CSR 
defined as the company’s “status and activities with respect to its perceived societal 
obligations” (Brown and Dacin 1997, p. 68; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001, p. 226).  
 Overall, the empirical evidence is suggestive of a positive relationship between 
CSR and firm performance. Studies that focus on the relationship between CSR and firm 
performance are built on four mechanism: slack resources, good management, penance, 
and insurance mechanisms (Kang et al. 2016). Slack resources mechanism is based on the 
assumption that firms engage in CSR because they have slack resources due to their 
prosperous financial performance. Good management mechanism is based on the 
explanation that good management subsumes CSR and hence firm’s superior financial 
performance. Penance mechanism posits that firms engage in CSR to attenuate the 
adverse effect of the past corporate social irresponsibility. Insurance mechanism explains 
that CSR serves as a backup for firms if and when a firm gets exposed for corporate 
social irresponsibility (CSI). Kang et al.(2016) test these four mechanisms simultaneously 
in their empirical model and find that firms financially benefit from CSR through the 
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good management and penance mechanisms and not the slack resources and insurance 
mechanisms. However, the authors also find that the penance mechanism does not offset 
the adverse performance effects of CSI. The authors conclude that CSR leads to financial 
performance and not the other way around.   
Review papers and meta-analyses have reported a positive association between 
CSR and financial performance (Margolis 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky et 
al. 2003) and a negative association between CSI and financial performance (Kölbel 
2017). Specifically, CSR is shown to be significantly related to future revenue and 
growth on sales. The above discussed evidence provides the following hypothesis: 
H5: CSR is positively related to the firm’s sales growth. 
CPA and Sales Growth 
As discussed earlier, lobbying and campaign contributions are the two most 
commonly used forms of CPA. In 2018, corporations spend $3.46 billion on lobbying 
alone5. Firms engage in CPA to influence the public policy process and outcomes and 
gain a competitive advantage (Getz 1997).  
A great body of research in CPA has examined the financial outcome of CPA for 
the firm (Bonardi et al. 2006; Hadani and Coombes 2015; Hillman et al. 1999; Lux 
2016). A meta-analysis on the drivers and outcomes of CPA has shown a positive link 
between corporate political activity as measured by firm’s total campaign contributions 
and lobbying expenditures, and firm economic performance captured by economic-based 
measures including return on assets (ROA) and return on investment (ROI). Published 
                                               
5 Based on calculations by Center for Responsible Politics. See https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
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research demonstrates that CPA can lead to changes in expenditures, sales, and revenue 
by influencing trade policy (Kerr et al. 2014), influencing competitive resource 
environment to the firm’s advantage (Capron and Chatain 2008), securing government 
contracts (Ridge et al. 2017), delivering tax breaks (Richter et al. 2009), and shielding the 
firm from corporate fraud detection (Yu and Yu 2011). CPA has been found to increase 
accounting and market measures of firm performance (Chen et al. 2015b; Hadani et al. 
2015; Hadani and Schuler 2013; Lux 2016; Lux et al. 2011), as well as firm value (Hill et 
al. 2013; Ridge et al. 2017; Schuler et al. 2017). Recently, Zheng et al. (2015) supported 
that having political ties is positively associated with firm’s sales growth. Building on 
this evidence and findings of published research, I propose the following:  
H6: CPA is positively related to the firm’s sales growth.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 Sample and Data Structure 
 
The sampling frame I chose consists of all CEOs of Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms 
who were appointed at any time during 2001 to 2011. This frame includes 3770 CEOs 
(3770 CEO-company pairs). The data required for my study were generally abundant for 
these major companies (but more limited for smaller firms). I sample newly appointed 
CEOs so that I can observe their firms’ CSR and CPA from the onset of their 
appointment.  
As described below, the year 2003 is the first year that CSR data is available for a 
wide set of companies rather than a much smaller pool of firms. Additional sampling 
filters are also applied. First, to control for the industry-level CSR and CPA, I only 
include CEOs of firms in industries that have at least five other firms in the CSR and 
CPA database (based on 2-digit SIC code). To do so, I created a variable “less than or 
equal to 5?”, which flags the companies that do not have at least five competitors in their 
industries. Second, I exclude CEOs who have previously been CEOs of other companies; 
this is due to the measure of CEO political ideology, which is based on each CEO’s 
political donations behavior prior to their first CEO appointment. There are several
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individuals in the sampling frame who have been a CEO (in one or more companies) 
before the year 2001 and the CEO of only one company after the year 2001, which the 
start time window of my research. For clarity I call these individuals non-freshmen_2001 
CEOs. So, when I drop the CEO appointed before 2001, non-freshmen_2001 CEOs will 
be disguised as first-time CEOs, while in fact they are not. To prevent this, I created a 
variable indicating if the person has been a CEO before 2001 and then added this to the 
master dataset so that I would be able to drop these CEOs in later steps. Third, I only 
include CEOs who serve at least two years, since tenures less than two years might not 
have a significant impact on companies’ CSR and CPA behavior resulted from CEOs’ 
actions. Applying these criteria yields a sample of 1751 CEOs. I use a lagged design so 
that CEO activism temporally precedes CSR, CPA, and relative sales growth 
measurements. For every CEO, I measure their respective company’s CSR and CPA two 
years after they became the CEO (year t) and sales growth is measured three years after 
the CEO was appointed (!"#$%&'(!"#$%&') − 1). 
Data Sources 
The secondary datasets analyzed in this dissertation were collected from several 
sources, including publicly available data and proprietary data repositories. The data 
sources include BoardEx, MSCI (formerly KLD), Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), 
and COMPUSTAT (ExecuComp). In the following section, I will briefly explain each 
data source and explain the variables borrowed from each one. 
BoardEx 
BoardEx data provides detailed profiles of directors and executives for 20,000+ 
companies from 1999 to present. It includes virtually all U.S. public companies. This 
 105 
database contains data on executives’ and directors’ background, compensation, 
employment, social membership, and relationship. From this database I collect all the 
information available related to each CEO’s affiliation to various nonbusiness 
organizations including non-profit organizations, religious institutions, club 
memberships, university board of trusties, etc. I use the count of CEO’s affiliation to the 
said organizations to arrive at CEO activism proxy variable. 
MSCI (formerly KLD)  
The MSCI data set was created by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
research and analytics in 1991. KLD was acquired by MSCI in 2010. KLD is a widely 
used database in academic literature (e.g., Chin et al. 2013; Kang et al. 2016; Mishra and 
Modi 2016) providing annual data on firms’ strength and concerns on multiple social 
issue dimensions including community, corporate governance, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and product quality and safety. KLD annually 
measures the CSR profiles of firms and is considered the best available data for 
measuring CSR (Chin et al. 2013).  
KLD measures CSR in multiple categories such as environment, community, 
employee relations, etc. Under each category, there are several “strength” and “concern” 
indicators. For example, the community category includes eight strength indicators such 
as charitable giving and six concern indicators such as adverse economic impact. The 
company is rated on each indicator based on the presence or absence (binary) of the 
specific item. For example, if a company has donated more than 1.5% of trailing three-
year net earnings before taxes to charity, the “charitable giving” indicator equals 1, 
otherwise 0. 
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Center for Responsible Politics 
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) provides data for all campaign contributions 
and lobbying directed toward the federal government. Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) records all individual contributions of more than $200 to individual candidates; to 
campaign committees for federal office; to national, state, and local parties, and to 
political action committees (PACs). FEC data is also available through the Center for 
Responsive Politics6—a non-partisan research institute.  
COMPUSTAT (ExecuComp) 
COMPUSTAT database provides financial and market information on active and 
inactive companies across the world. COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation 
(ExecuComp) provides information on CEOs such as CEOs full name, title, position, age, 
gender, and tenure.  
Measures 
 
Based on the theoretical definitions of the constructs in my model, I used the 
appropriate available variables in the previously described datasets. My model predicts 
the effect of one explanatory (CEO activism) and one moderating variable (CEO political 
ideology) on two main mediating variables (CSR and CPA), as well as the effect of the 
mediating variables on the dependent variable (sales growth). In the following section, I 
describe the operationalization of each conceptual variable. Table 12 provides a summary 
of operational definitions of variables. 
 
 
                                               
6 www.opensecrets.org 
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Table 12. Operational Definition of Variables 
Variable 
 
Operationalization Data 
Source 
Example 
studies 
 Independent Variable 
 
  
CEO Activism  
 
Count of CEO’s affiliations to various 
non-business organizations including 
non-profit organizations, religious 
institutions, club memberships, 
university board of trusties, etc. 
 
BoardEx — 
 Mediating Variables 
 
  
CSR (t+2) Firm’s annual net CSR score = sum 
of all the firm’s strengths minus sum 
of all concerns.  
This is calculated for two years after 
the CEO’s appointment. 
MSCI 
(KLD) 
(Chin et al. 
2013; David 
et al. 2007; 
Wong et al. 
2011) 
CPA (t+2)  
 
Aggregate of firm’s lobbying 
expenditures and donations to 
political action committees (PACs). 
This is calculated for two years after 
the CEO’s appointment. 
Center for 
Responsible 
Politics 
(Lux et al. 
2011; Ridge 
et al. 2017) 
 Moderating Variable 
 
  
CEO Political 
Ideology (t-10, t-
1) 
  
CEO’s political donations behavior 
for the ten years prior to the time they 
became the CEO (from year t-10 to t-
1, where t is the first year of their 
tenure). This measure is the average 
of four indicators, each capturing a 
distinct aspect of CEO’s political 
donations. The measure ranges from 0 
to 1. Conservative if value less than 
0.5, liberal otherwise. 
 
Center for 
Responsible 
Politics 
(Chin et al. 
2013; Di 
Giuli and 
Kostovetsky 
2014; Elnahas 
and Kim 
2017; Gupta 
et al. 2017; 
Unsal et al. 
2016) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 
  
Relative Sales 
Growth (t+3) 
 
Percentage change in sales revenue 
measure for three years after the 
CEO’s appointment (!"#$%&'(!"#$%&') − 1). 
 
Compustat  
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7 https://news.gallup.com/poll/114016/state-states-political-party-affiliation.aspx 
 
Control Variables 
 
CEO Duality  Dummy variable: 
1 if CEO also board chair,  
0 otherwise. 
 
ExcuComp 
(Compustat) 
(Chin et al. 
2013; Hadani 
et al. 2015) 
Year became 
CEO 
The year CEO was appointed. ExcuComp 
(Compustat) 
— 
Firm Size (t-1) 
 
Sales (logged) measured in the year 
prior to the CEO’s appointment. 
Compustat (Chin et al. 
2013; Hillman 
et al. 2004; 
Lux et al. 
2011; Schuler 
et al. 2002) 
 
Firm 
Performance (t-
1) 
 Market-to-book value of common 
equity minus the mean of the value 
for the industry (logged). This is 
calculated for one year prior to CEO’s 
appointment. 
Compustat (Chin et al. 
2013) 
Pre-CEO CPA 
(, − 1, ,.........) CPA (lobbying + PAC) averaged for the year CEO was appointed and the 
year before that (i.e. t and t-1) 
Center for 
Responsible 
Politics 
 
CPA Within 
Industry (t-1) 
 
For each firm, the proportion of a 
firm’s competitors in the same 
industry (with the same two-digit SIC 
code) that spent on lobbying and 
PACs, calculated for the year CEO 
was appointed. 
 
Center for 
Responsible 
Politics 
(Hillman et al. 
2004; Schuler 
et al. 2002) 
Industry-
Average CSR t 
 
The average CSR for all the firms in 
the same industry (based on the 2-
digit SIC code)—excluding the focal 
firm, calculated for the year CEO was 
appointed. 
 
MSCI 
(KLD) 
(Chin et al. 
2013; Matten 
and Moon 
2008)  
 Instrumental Variables   
Headquarters 
Location 
Binary variable: 
1 Firm’s headquarters located in the 
ten most Democratically oriented 
stats (as rated by Gallup7)  
0 otherwise. 
Compustat (Chin et al. 
2013) 
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Independent Variable: CEO Activism 
Initially, I set out to measure CEO Activism by the count of times a CEO has 
publicly communicated his or her stance on a social-political by issuing a formal 
statement, tweeting, writing an op-ed two years prior to appointment. This data was then 
meant to be put up for assessment by a panel of judges to determine the level of 
controversiality of the issues as well as the ideological valance of the stance (liberal-
leaning statement vs. conservative-leaning statement). In addition, the depth of the CEO’s 
stance (how many times the CEO has taken a side on a particular issue) as well as the 
breadth of the issues (how many different issues the CEO has taken a side on) was 
planned to be measured. To obtain the CEO statements, I scraped textual data in various 
databases to identify sources that contained the names from the initial CEO list (3770 
CEOs). This yielded 53760 articles in total, and among those 48877 had full text that 
would be used for text mining. I used SAS text miner to do word parsing on the articles 
and to identify how many articles contained generic social and political terms and how 
many times they had appeared in those articles. The terms considered in the word parsing 
output included abortion, planned parenthood, LGBT, gender identity, gay marriage, gay, 
transgender, climate change, environmental impact, greenhouse emission, pollutants, 
poverty, guns, civil rights, immigration, affordable housing, race, homelessness, student 
loan, religion freedom, euthanasia, death penalty, globalization, government mandates, 
confederate flag, nationalism, bullying, and marijuana. The word parsing output yielded 
CEO’s overall 
degree of 
political 
activism (t-10, t-
1) 
CEO’s total number of political 
donations for 10 years prior to CEO's 
start date. 
Center for 
Responsible 
Politics 
(Chin et al. 
2013) 
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2718 articles that contained the aforementioned terms. An examination of these articles 
showed that most of the articles did not contain a CEO statement, out of those that did, 
most of them did not contain a CEO statement on social political issues.  
Therefore, I opted for obtaining a proxy variable for measuring CEO activism. To 
construct this proxy, I used BoardEx data that contains detailed profiles of CEOs of the 
U.S. public companies. The specific data that I used from BoardEx was information on 
social and political memberships of the CEOs. This data has a list of each CEO’s 
affiliations to all clubs, societies, non-profit organizations, religious institutions, 
university board of trustees, etc. I constructed CEO activism by the count of the 
institutions to which each CEO is affiliated. In the next section, I explain the procedure I 
used to obtain this proxy. 
Procedure 
BoardEx data includes several tables containing information about CEOs. The 
tables of my interest called “board summary” and “director profile other activities”, 
contain director information (including their role in the company) and their affiliation 
with various non-business organizations. To calculate CEO activism using these tables, I 
took several data pre-processing steps on their fields and data, a subject to which now I 
turn.  
In the “board summary” table, there is a field that indicates the director’s role in 
the company. For the ‘Individual Role’ field, I first selected “CEO” and “Chairman”. 
After selecting the unique director IDs in the filtered data, I matched them with the 
“director profile other activities” table that contained CEO affiliations information. The 
next step was to match this with my sampled CEOs. There were several challenges in 
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matching due to difference in data structure and formatting. For example, the names are 
not in the same format in two dataset (one could be in “First Name Middle initial Last 
Name” format and the other table was in the format of “Last Name, First Name initial”). 
To get an accurate match, several steps were taken. First, I stripped the titles, nicknames 
in parentheses, extra titles, etc. from full name field to identify first, middle, and last 
names in BoardEx data table. To ensure accuracy, I first merged BoardEx data and the 
CEO sample (n = 1751) on last name and then kept only those that had an identical first 
name initial. Then I manually checked the match between the CEO and BoardEx data to 
ensure exact match. Next, for each CEO, I calculated the number of memberships. Those 
CEOs who had no recorded affiliations in the BoardEx data are assigned 0 for activism, 
with the assumption that if they had any affiliations, they would have been reflected in 
the BoardEx dataset. I call the resulting dataset master data. In the next paragraphs, I 
explain the challenges and approaches in developing the master data by adding CSR, 
CPA, sales growth, and control variables data to it. 
Mediating Variables: CSR and CPA 
CSR 
Companies CSR data is available from 2003 to 2013 for a large number of U.S. 
public companies. Consistent with previous research (Chin et al. 2013), to measure each 
firm’s annual CSR rating, I included the six KLD categories that reflect the firm’s 
commitments to stakeholders beyond the firm’s owners. A firm’s net CSR score for each 
firm was calculated as the sum of all the firm’s strengths minus the sum of all concerns. 
This approach is consistent with published research (e.g., Chin et al. 2013; Choi and 
Wang 2009; David et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 2017; Wong et al. 2011). CSR score for each 
firm was measured two years after its CEO’s appointment. 
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Procedure 
To merge the calculated CSR score with the master dataset several challenges 
presented themselves. One, in the CSR data, ticker of the companies was not unique, 
because outside U.S. companies had the same ticker as some of the U.S. companies. 
Therefore, if I were to merge the CSR data with the master data, I would have multiple 
matches for some of the CEOs (companies). To fix this issue, I first merged the CSR data 
and master data, and then counted the number of rows for each ticker/company pair. 
Next, I went over those with multiple pairs, identified the non-matched ones (out of the 
U.S. companies), and then removed those companies from my data.    
CPA 
The data source for calculating CPA is Center for Responsible Politics. I measure 
CPA by aggregating firm’s PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures two years after 
CEO’s appointment.  
Procedure 
The challenge in matching the lobbying data with the master data was that 
company’s ticker is not provided in the lobbying table and therefore I could only rely on 
the companies’ names. Similar to merging on CEO’s names, merging on companies’ 
names is challenging since different datasets could use various styles such as having 
abbreviations in company names (for example XYZ corporation vs XYZ corp.). To 
address this issue, first I only matched lobbying data with the master data on the 
companies’ names initials and also the year of interest for CPA (two years after CEO’s 
appointment). Then I categorized the initial matched data into different groups based on 
the length of the company name. Next, in these sub-groups, I filtered the rows that were 
matches between companies in the master data and the lobbying data. The match criterion 
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was different in various sub-group datasets. For datasets containing longer names, I 
matched on a greater number of characters compared to the datasets containing 
companies with shorter names. Next, I concatenated all of the matched cases from all 
sub-group datasets and dropped the unessential variables. Then I left joined the master 
dataset and lobbying data and calculated total lobbying amount for CEOs (companies). 
Similar steps were taken for adding the companies’ PAC data to the master dataset. 
Moderator: CEO Political Ideology 
I measure CEO political ideology through the CEO’s political donations for ten 
years prior to the time they became CEO (from year t-10 to t-1, where t is the first year of 
their appointment). For example, if a CEO was appointed in year 2005, his or her 
political donations for the time frame 1995 to 2004 are examined. This ten-year window 
includes five congressional election cycles and two presidential elections, to allow 
meaningful interpretation of a CEO’s donation pattern. Researchers have shown that 
political donations reflect individual’s political ideologies (Ansolabehere et al. 2003; 
Ensley 2009; Francia 2003). To measure CEO’s political ideology, I adopt Chin et al.’s 
calculation of liberalism index (Chin et al. 2013). Researchers have used this index to 
measure CEO’s political ideology and this measure has been validated across several 
studies (e.g. Briscoe et al. 2014; Chin et al. 2013; Chin and Semadeni 2017; Gupta et al. 
2017). The data used for this measurement is sourced from the Center for Responsible 
Politics and includes CEO’s political donations to individual candidates and party 
committees. The liberalism index measurement includes four indicators each tapping a 
distinct aspect of CEO’s political contributions. These four aspects include financial 
commitment, behavioral commitment, commitment persistency, and political orientation. 
 114 
The measurement is the average of the four following indicators 1) the ratio of the 
number of donations to Democrats to total number of donations, 2) the ratio of dollar 
value of donations to Democrats to total dollar value of donations , 3) the ratio of the 
number of years the CEO made donations to Democrats to total number of years the CEO 
made donations , and 4) the ratio of the number of distinct recipients who were identified 
as Democrats to the total number of distinct recipients. Consistent with the main premise 
of political ideology that is relatively stable across time (Jost 2006), the liberalism index 
has been shown to be stable across CEO’s tenure (Chin et al. 2013; Chin and Semadeni 
2017). The scores from the index range from zero to one, denoting degree of CEO’s 
liberalism. Values less than 0.5 indicates conservatism and values greater than 0.5 
representing liberalism. 
Procedure 
To obtain the liberalism index, I started with the individual contribution data from 
Center for Responsible Politics for election cycles 1992 to 2014. This window covers 
seven election cycles. After fixing some formatting issues and concatenating donation 
records across election cycles, the next step would be to match the individual 
contributions with my CEO sample. However, if I were to merge contribution and CEO 
data on both first and last name at the same time, I would lose some potential CEO 
contributions. The reason is that in the contribution dataset, for some contributors, there 
is only an initial recorded for the first name (e.g. Faust, R M MRS). To avoid this issue, I 
first joined the two datasets on last name. Then, I only kept those who also had the same 
first letter in the first name.  
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Dependent Variable: Sales Growth 
For each company, the sales growth is measured as percentage change in sales 
revenue (!"#$%&'(!"#$%&') − 1) where t is the year CEO was appointed.  
Procedure 
I added the sales data for both two and three years after CEO started to the master 
dataset. And then calculated the relative sales growth (!"#$%&'(!"#$%&') − 1) for each company. 
Control Variables 
To properly control for and isolate the effects of the independent and moderator 
variables, I include several control variables in the statistical model. Table 12 lists all the 
control variables, their operationalization, data sources, and the sample studies. 
Master Dataset 
The resulting master dataset contains information of 293 CEOs. The master 
dataset contains CEO activism (a numerical value) measure, CEO political ideology 
(liberalism index) calculated for 10 years before CEOs appointment, the CEO’s firm’s 
CSR score and the CEO’s firm’s lobbying and PAC spending calculated for two years 
after the CEO start and the CEO’s firm’s relative sales growth (percentage change in 
sales revenue) calculated for three years after the CEO’s appointment. In the next 
paragraph, I will explain the estimation method used for testing the hypotheses. 
Estimation Method 
  
I examine the interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO political 
ideology on firm’s CSR, CPA, and sales growth using simultaneous equations modeling 
approach (Greene 2003). It is possible that the error terms of the study variables are 
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correlated. Therefore because endogeneity is probable in my proposed model, ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression might result in bias and inconsistent parameter estimation 
(Kumar 2009; Lee and Weng 2013). To address this issue, it is critical that all equations 
are estimated simultaneously (Greene 2003). Therefore, I employ three-stage least square 
(3SLS) method of estimation. 3SLS allows for simultaneous equations estimation. 3SLS 
allows correlation among error terms (Greene 2003). One important benefit of the 3SLS 
over two stage least square (2SLS) is that it is more consistent and asymptotically more 
efficient (Greene 2003). A necessary but not sufficient condition for estimating 
parameters simultaneously is identification. Identification precedes estimation and 
basically addresses if the equations are even estimable (Greene 2003). The problem of 
identification is not related to sample size or sampling properties. The 3SLS estimation 
approach has been adopted by past research that have empirical similarity with this 
dissertation (Cuypers et al. 2017; Kumar 2009; Lee and Weng 2013). In the next chapter, 
I explain the results of the hypotheses testing.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, I present the results of the 3SLS estimation. The organization of 
this chapter is as follows. First, I summarize the variables’ descriptive statistics and 
discuss the multicollinearity issue. Next, I will present the equations in the 3SLS system 
of equations. Lastly, I explain the model fitting and the 3SLS results. To run the 3SLS 
estimation, I used the proc syslin procedure in SAS. 
Table 13 summarizes variables’ descriptive statistics including means, standard 
deviations, min, and max. The univariate statistics of CEO political ideology indicate that 
the CEOs in the sample are on average inclined toward conservatism, with a mean of 4.0. 
Figure 8 presents the frequency distribution of CEO political ideology. The CPA measure 
is of a vastly different magnitude and the shape of its distribution is not close to normal. 
To address the issue, I log transformed CPA and included the transformed values in the 
3SLS model. 
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Figure 8. Frequency Distribution of CEO Political Ideology (N = 262) 
 
 
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics (N = 262) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CPA has been logged transformed. The reported descriptive statistics is for the original variable. 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
1. CEO activism 8.29 7.71 0 32 
2. CEO political ideology 0.41 0.35 0 1 
3. CSR (t+2) 0.74 2.91 - 6 9 
4. CPA (t+2) 1,915,489 3,588,785 1750 28666500 
5. Sales growth  4.67 16.64 - 92.69 57.34 
6. Industry-average CSR - 0.41 0.54  - 2.80 1.26 
7. CPA within industry 0.35 0.15 0.03 0.63 
8. Pre-CEO CPA 2,488,841 4,467,806 0 38257696 
9. CEO’s total number of 
contributions 
14.68 26.33 1 313 
10. Firm size (t-1) 8.60 1.51 2.55 12.08 
11. Firm Performance (t-1) 6934 18186 - 15795 148525 
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Table 14 presents the variables correlations. As shown in Table 14, there is a strong 
correlation among firm size, firm performance, and pre_CEO CPA. To prevent the 
multicollinearity issue, I use the third principal component of these variables. The reason 
is that the strong correlation among these variables creates multicollinearity. Principal 
component allows me to summarize these correlated control variables (Rencher 2012).   
Based on the model illustrated in Figure 5, I use a three-equation 3SLS model to 
simultaneously estimate the interaction effect of CEO activism and CEO political 
ideology on CPA and CSR, and the effect of CSR and CPA on the firm’s sales growth. I 
now turn to the equations and explain the variables included in each one.  
Equation 1. CSR score is the dependent variable and CEO activism, CEO political 
ideology, and their interaction term are the independent variables. In this equation, I 
control for industry-average CSR, CEO-duality, headquarters location, firm performance, 
firm size, and pre_CEO CPA.  
Equation 2. CPA (logged) is the dependent variable. CEO activism, CEO political 
ideology, and their interaction term are the independent variables. In equation 2, I control 
for CEO-duality, firm performance, firm size, pre_CEO CPA, CPA within industry 
(logged), headquarters location, and year became CEO. 
Equation 3. Sales growth is the dependent variable. CSR and CPA (logged) are the 
independent variables and year became the CEO is a control variable. Using the 3SLS 
estimation technique, the data is fit to the model. 
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Table 14. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N= 262) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. CEO 
activism 
8.29 7.72 1.00 0.05 0.08 0.26** 0.07 -0.05 0.18** 0.14* 0.15* 0.35** 0.27** 0.12* 0.15* 
2. CEO 
political 
ideology 
0.41 0.35 0.05 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.02 0.13* 
3. CSR 0.74 2.91 0.08 0.04 1.00 0.32** 0.07 0.28** -0.13* 0.23** 0.00 0.28** 0.22** 0.17** 0.18** 
4. CPA (log) 13.04 1.87 0.26* 0.10 0.32* 1.00 -0.07 0.04 0.15** 0.48** 0.07 0.53** 0.39** 0.05 0.21** 
5. Sales 
growth 
4.67 16.64 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.07 1.00 0.04 0.01 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15* -0.12* 0.07 0.03 
6. Industry-
average CSR 
-0.41 0.54 -0.05 -0.04 0.28** 0.04 0.04 1.00 -0.33* 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.08 
7. CPA 
within 
industry 
(log) 
0.35 0.15 0.18** -0.01 -0.13* 0.15* 0.01 -
0.33** 
1.00 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.15* -0.15* 
8. Pre-CEO 
CPA 
2488841 4467806 0.14* 0.06 0.23** 0.48** -0.09 0.01 0.06 1.00 0.04 0.34** 0.43** 0.02 0.21** 
9. CEO total 
number of 
contributions 
14.68 26.33 0.15* 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.12 0.00 0.05 0.04 1.00 0.18** 0.21** 0.06 0.02 
10. Firm size 8.6 1.51 0.35** 0.11 0.28** 0.53** -
0.15* 
-0.04 0.11 0.34** 0.18** 1.00 0.50** 0.09 0.10 
11. Firm 
Performance 
6934 18186 0.27** 0.11 0.22** 0.39** -
0.12* 
0.11 0.01 0.43** 0.21** 0.50** 1.00 0.04 0.29** 
12. CEO 
duality 
— — 0.12* -0.02 0.17** 0.05 0.07 -0.01* 0.15* 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.04 1.00 -0.02 
13. 
Headquarters 
location 
— — 0.15* 0.13* 0.18** 0.21** 0.03 0.08 -0.15* 0.21** 0.02** 0.10 0.29**    -0.02 1.00 
* Correlation is significant at the p < 0.05 (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
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Having identified the system of equations, I run 3SLS with the initial sample including 
293 observations (Model 1). In the following lines, I explain the residual analysis of the 
data fittings. The parameter estimates, significance, system weighted R-square, and 
residual normality plots are reported in the Appendix.  
Having run the initial 3SLS, I examine the regression residuals of Model 1. To do 
so, I examine the outlier plots for the main variables: CPA, CSR, and sales growth. I plot 
and detect the outliers for each variable. First, I examine the sales growth variable 
outliers. Most of the outliers for CPA and sales growth overlapped. I eliminated 8 
detected outliers for sales growth and CPA and re-ran the 3SLS with the remaining 285 
observations (Model 2). Comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 reveals an 
improvement to the system weighted R-square, from 0.12 to 0.14. In addition, the 
parameter estimates of the effect of CSR and CPA on sales growth change from non-
significant to significant. Next, I examine the CSR residuals from Model 2 and eliminate 
21 outliers leaving 264 observations (Model 3). Model 3 estimation leads to slight 
improvement to the system weighted R-square (from 0.138 to 0.141) and significance of 
the parameter estimate of the interaction effect on CPA. Finally, I examine the residuals 
from Model 4 and remove the remaining 2 outliers reaching a sample of 262 
observations. Model 4 has a slightly lower system weighted R-Square, but the parameter 
estimates significance levels remain unchanged. Based on the R-square, removing the 
outliers did not take away the explanatory power of the models. Additionally, the 
normality plots of the residuals indicate that the residuals get closer to normality every 
step of the outlier elimination. See Table A1 in the Appendix section for the reported 
contrast between the models. Given the improvements to the system weighted R-square, 
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the significance of the estimates, as well as the improvements to the normality of the 
residuals, I choose Model 4 for estimation. Model four 3SLS results are reported in Table 
15. 
Table 15. 3SLS Results 
Variable Equation 1 
DV: CSR 
Equation 2 
DV: CPA 
Equation 3 
DV: Sales Growth 
Hypotheses Test 
Result 
Intercept 0.00** 
(0.90) 
0.00 
(60.85) 
0.00* 
(1206.2) 
— 
CEO activism 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
— H1 not supported. 
H2 not supported 
CEO political 
ideology 
0.02 
(0.52) 
-0.08 
(0.40) 
—  
CEO activism ´ 
CEO political 
ideology 
0.70 
(0.05) 
0.25* 
(0.04) 
— H3 not supported. 
H4 supported.  
CSR — — 3.62** 
(7.90) 
H5 supported. 
CPA (logged) — — - 3.08** 
(9.53) 
H6 not supported. 
Control Variables 
CEO duality 0.19*** 
(0.87) 
-0.00 
(0.66) 
—  
Industry-average 
CSR 
0,22*** 
(0.19) 
— —  
Principal 
component of firm 
performance, firm 
size, and pre-CEO 
CPA 
0.13** 
(0.20) 
0.25*** 
(0.15) 
—  
CPA within 
industry (logged) 
— 0.18*** 
(0.15) 
—  
Year became CEO — 0.00 
(0.03) 
.26* 
(.60) 
 
Headquarters 
location 
0.17** 
(0.38) 
0.23*** 
(0.25) 
—  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* indicates p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
** indicates p < 0.01, two-tailed. 
*** indicates p < 0.001, two-tailed. 
System Weighted R-square = 0.13 
 
 In hypothesis 1, I argue for the positive main effect of CEO activism on CSR. 
The 3SLS result does not support a relationship between CEO activism, as measured by 
the count of CEO’s membership of various non-business organizations, and CSR. In 
hypothesis 2, I predict a positive relationship between CEO activism and firm’s CPA. In 
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equation 2, I find that there is no main effect of CEO activism on CPA, therefore 
hypothesis 2 is not supported. In hypothesis 3, I predict an interaction effect between 
CEO activism and CEO political ideology on CSR. Based on the 3SLS estimates, in 
equation 1, I do not find a statistically significant interaction effect of CEO activism and 
CEO political ideology on CSR. To visually assess the effect of CEO activism on CSR, I 
first mean split CEO political ideology and created the scatterplots with CSR on Y axis 
and CEO activism on the X axis. Figure A1 and Figure A2 in the Appendix illustrate the 
scatter plots. Based on the visual examination of the plots, there seems to be a curvilinear 
effect of CEO activism on CSR for liberal CEOs. However, after testing for the 
curvilinear effect, I did not find a significant effect of CEO activism on CSR for liberals. 
In hypothesis 4, I hypothesize an interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO 
political ideology on CPA. The interaction between CEO activism and CEO political 
ideology has a positive and statistically significant (p = .01) effect on a firm’s CPA 
spending. This result is consistent with hypothesis 4. According to this result, when 
CEO’s political ideology is leaning toward liberalism, the association between CEO 
activism as measured by the number of non-business organizations the CEO is affiliated 
with, and the firm’s CPA spending is stronger. I have plotted the interaction effect in 
Figure 9. As shown in the figure, it appears that on average, when CEO activism, as 
measured by the number of CEO affiliation to non-business organizations, increases the 
relationship between CEO activism and firm’s CPA spending becomes stronger (steeper 
slop) for liberal CEOs compared to conservative CEOs. 
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Figure 9. Interaction Effect of CEO Activism and CEO Political Ideology on CPA 
 
In hypothesis 5, I predict a positive relationship between CSR and sales growth. I 
find that, consistent with hypothesis 5, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between CSR and sales growth (p = .009). Therefore, hypothesis 5 is supported. Finally, 
in hypothesis 6, I predict a significant a positive relationship between CPA and sales 
growth. However, I find that there is a negative and significant relationship between CPA 
and sales growth (p = .004). 
In summary, I find that the interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO 
political ideology is related to the firm’s sales growth through CPA spending. It appears 
that the as CEO activism increases, the relationship between CEO activism and CPA 
becomes stronger, but only for liberal CEOs. Moreover, this increase in firm’s CPA 
spending is negatively related to the firm’s sales growth. With regards to CSR, consistent 
with past research, I find a significant positive relationship between CSR and sales 
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CPA
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growth. However, the data does not substantiate an interaction effect between CEO 
activism and CEO political ideology on CSR.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Findings 
 
In this dissertation, I use a lagged design to investigate the effect of CEO 
activism, as measured by the number of non-business organizations with which the CEO 
is affiliated, on the firm’s CSR and CPA as well as the effect on the firm’s sales growth. I 
analyze data from all CEOs of S&P’s 1500 companies who were appointed in the time 
window 2001 to 2011. After several steps of data cleaning and data pre-processing, I 
arrive at a sample of 262 CEOs. For every CEO, CEO activism is operationalized by the 
number of non-business organizations to which a CEO is affiliated. This data is provided 
from the BoardEx dataset. The firm’s CSR score—as rated by MSCI— and CPA 
spending—measured by the aggregate of lobbying and PAC contribution dollar 
amount—are analyzed for two years after the CEO’s start. The firm’s sales growth is 
measured by the percentage change in sales revenue for three years after the CEO’s 
appointment (!"#$%&'(!"#$%&') − 1). 
I draw on upper echelons and moral foundation theories as well as the reviewed 
literature on CSR and CPA. I theorize that CEO activism, a manifestation of the CEOs
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underlying values and beliefs, as measured by the number of non-business organizations 
the CEO is a member of, is positively related with both firm’s CSR score and CPA 
spending. Based on my empirical analysis, I do not find the baseline positive effect of 
CEO activism on CSR and CPA to be true on average across all firms in my sample in 
the time frame 2001 to 2011. 
Further, I predict interactions effects between CEO activism and CEO political 
ideology on firm’s CSR and CPA. I theorize that there is positive interaction effect of 
CEO activism and CEO’s political ideology, as measured by an index of CEO’s political 
contributions ten years prior to their tenure (liberalism index), on the firm’s CPA. I 
predict that all else equal, for liberal CEOs there will be a stronger relationship between 
CEO activism and the firm’s CPA spending compared with the CPA spending of firms 
with the conservative CEOs. I do find that the interaction effect of CEO activism and 
CEO political ideology to be positively related to the firm’s CPA spending with a 
stronger association between CEO activism and firm’s CPA for liberal CEOs. I also 
theorize a significant interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO political 
ideology on the firm’s CSR score. I predict a curvilinear relationship (diminishingly 
positive) between CEO activism and CEO political ideology on CSR for liberal CEOs 
and no significant positive effect on CSR for conservative CEOs. The data does not 
substantiate the predicted interaction effect on CSR.  
Lastly, I predict that CSR and CPA are positively related to firm’s sales growth. 
The results show that consistent with past research, CSR, measured two years after 
CEO’s appointment, is positively related to the firm’s sales growth, measured by the 
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percentage of sales growth three year after the CEO’s start. However, contrary to my 
prediction, I find that CPA is negatively related to the firm’s sales growth.  
Contributions to Theory 
 
In this dissertation I make several contributions to theory. First, I develop a 
theoretical model explaining and predicting the relationship among CEO activism, CEO 
political ideology, CSR, CPA, and firm’s sales growth. I theorize and empirically test 
CSR, CPA, and sales growth as the outcomes of CEO activism. These are important firm 
outcomes for the firm, thereby contributing to improving the nomological network of 
CEO activism.  
Second, this dissertation provides some evidence into the current scholarship’s 
conflicting perspectives on CEO activism, whether it is as part of the firm’s non-market 
strategy or distinct from it (Chatterji and Toffel 2019). For example, Clemensen (2017) 
states that CEO activism is part of the firm’s CSR. On the other hand, Chatterji and 
Toffel (2019) suggest that CEO activism is distinct from CSR and CPA. I theorize CEO 
activism as an antecedent to CSR and CPA by predicting that the interaction effect 
between CEO activism and CEO political ideology affect CSR and CPA. I find evidence 
of the interaction effect on CPA, suggesting that CEO activism is an antecedent therefore 
distinct from CPA. However, the data I examined did not substantiate the prediction of 
the interaction effect between CEO activism and CEO political ideology on CSR. 
Although I show that CEO activism is distinct from CPA, more research is needed to 
substantiate CEO activism as and antecedent rather a part of CPA and CSR.    
Third, I contribute to upper echelons theory. The main premise of upper echelons 
theory is that executives’ strategic decisions and organizational outcomes are driven by 
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their personalities, experiences, and values. However, there is very little empirical 
evidence casting light on the how CEO values influence non-market strategy elements, 
CSR and CPA, and bottom line outcome, firm’s sales growth. I provide evidence that 
CEO activism and CEO political ideology—a manifestation of CEO values— interact to 
effect how much the firm spends in the political space and how all this influences the 
firm’s sales growth.  
Fourth, I make a contribution to strategy research by identifying CEO activism as 
an antecedent of CPA, thereby expanding the scope of CPA literature. Prior studies have 
investigated the antecedents of CPA from different perspective and offered valuable 
insights into the important factors determining corporate political spending on lobbying 
and PACs (e.g. Hillman et al. 2004; Lux et al. 2011; Schuler et al. 2002). This 
dissertation introduces CEO activism as yet another predictor of CPA and expands the 
theory by identifying a boundary condition affecting CPA and ultimately sales growth. 
Specifically, previous scholars have examined drivers of CPA from firm, industry, issue, 
and institutional perspectives. Very few researchers have focused on CEO-related 
predictors of CPA (e.g. Chin et al. 2013). This research addresses this gap in our 
knowledge by examining how CEO activism, as measured by the number of non-business 
organizations a CEO is involved with, influences how much the firm spends in lobbying 
and PACs.  
Fifth, as explained in the literature review, the two major streams of non-market 
strategy, CSR and CPA, have mainly evolved separately. I advance non-market strategy 
research, by embedding both elements, CSR and CPA, in one theoretical model, thereby 
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answering scholars’ call (e.g. Doh et al. 2012; Dorobantu et al. 2017; Mellahi et al. 2016) 
for integration of the CSR and CPA. 
Finally, I make a notable empirical contribution to the emerging literature on 
CEO activism by introducing and incorporating a novel measure of CEO activism by 
using CEO affiliations to various non-business organizations. Past researchers have used 
framed field experiments (e.g. Chatterji and Toffel 2019; Dodd and Supa 2015) to 
examine the impact of CEO activism. Using BoardEx data, I operationalize CEO 
activism as the number of CEO affiliations to a variety of non-business organizations, 
providing another empirical testing of the effect of this construct. Future research could 
extend and improve this operationalization and make it a more precise gauge of CEO 
activism. 
Contributions to Practice 
 
This dissertation has several important practical implications for marketing. I 
provide new insights into the consequences of CEO activism, as measured by CEO 
affiliations with various non-business organizations, for the firm by showing that CEO 
activism and CEO’s political ideology interact to influence corporate political spending 
and sales growth. This finding provides knowledge for the CEOs to understand how their 
involvement with various non-business organizations and their political ideology impact 
the firm they are directing.  
I identify a significant boundary condition—CEO political ideology—related to 
the effect of CEO activism on corporate political activity and sales growth. I show that 
for liberal CEOs, there is a stronger association with CEO activism and CPA compared to 
the conservative CEOs. Moreover, CPA is negatively related to the sales growth. Based 
 131 
on this finding, liberal CEO’s activism is related to negative sales growth through the 
increase in the firm’s CPA spending. This is an interesting and unexpected finding that 
has implications for sales managers to employ sales tactics to offset the negative effect of 
liberal CEO’s activism on sales growth. Certainly, more research is required to 
substantiate the effect. Therefore, I call on more research to explore and substantiate the 
effect of CEO activism on sales growth.  
Although I do not find a connection among CEO activism, CEO political ideology 
and CSR, I do find a positive relationship between CSR and sales growth. In the face of a 
positive relationship between CSR and sales growth, the lack of connection between 
CEO activism and CSR is interesting that highlights the need to search for other 
unidentified boundary conditions than CEO political ideology. 
Moreover, by identifying CEO political ideology boundary condition, I provide 
actionable knowledge for corporate boards whose tasks involve overseeing and reacting 
to the strategic decisions of CEOs, specifically the decisions related to the firm’s 
corporate political activity.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
Like any other empirical study, this dissertation is not without limitations, which 
provide avenues for extensions and refinements. 
First, the effect I found in this dissertation may be bounded by the time frame 
(2001-2011) that I analyzed. Future research could test the veracity of the effect by 
analyzing more current data. 
 Second, the CEO activism data source—BoardEX— did not provide me with 
longitudinal data, which is the reason I constructed CEO activism by a numerical value 
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constant across the years. Although my model has a lagged design (measuring CSR and 
CPA 2 years and sales growth 3 years after the CEO’s appointment), and therefore a time 
dimension, it is still considered cross-sectional. An ideal dataset to analyze would be a 
panel dataset with information on CEO activism, CSR, CPA, and sales growth in a 
relatively long period of time. This data would enable researchers to establish causal 
relationships. 
Third, considering all the limitations, explained in the previous chapters, in 
obtaining actual CEO statements, I captured CEO activism by the proxy variable of the 
number of CEO memberships to non-business organizations. Although innovative in 
nature, it is a proxy measure and must be considered an imprecise measure of the CEO 
activism construct. Future research could contribute to the improvement of this measure 
by considering a more fine-tuned measurement, hence adding precision to it. For 
example, beside a count of CEO memberships to non-business organizations, future 
research may consider CEO power in their membership role by capturing whether or not 
the CEO is also on the board of directors in that organizations.  
Fourth, instances of CEO activism are growing and as a result data on CEO 
statements will be more available. Future research could consider capturing CEO 
activism by actual CEO statements—what I initially proposed in this dissertation—and 
compare and contrast the effect on CSR, CPA, and sales growth with the present results. 
Fifth, the empirical analyses in conducted with firms of S&P 1500 companies. 
Future research could examine the effect of CEO activism on firm’s outcomes in other 
settings—different countries with different institutional environments. Country-level 
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boundary conditions could be identified, contributing to broadening the scope of the 
present theoretical model. 
Lastly, I examine the effect of CEO activism captured by the CEO’s activities. 
Future research could explore how CEO activism is different from corporate activism, in 
which communications of the stances on issues comes from the company’s 
communication channels, for example statements on the company’s official Twitter 
account. It would be informative to extend our knowledge on the difference and 
similarities between the two and compare the extent of their effect on CSR, CPA, and 
sales growth.  
Conclusion 
In this dissertation I advance scholarship on the phenomenon CEO activism by 
examining its implications for important firm outcomes including corporate social 
responsibility, corporate political activity, and sales growth. I provide important insights 
on the growing scholarship on CEO activism by showing that CEO activism and CEO 
political ideology impact how much the company spends on lobbying and PACs and how 
this spending influences the company’s sales growth. This dissertation is among the firsts 
to explore CEO activism and its important implications for the firm. However, much 
remains unexplored. The impact of CEO activism on different stakeholder groups, 
whether and how it influences public policy, its role in shaping public attitude on issues, 
and its effect on the stock market are all important areas that researchers could cast light 
on. CEO activism is an important and growing area of inquiry and there is so much more 
for scholars to investigate. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Figure A1. Scatter plot of the effect of CEO activism on CSR for conservatives 
 
Figure A2. Scatter plot of the effect of CEO activism on CSR for liberals 
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Residual Analysis 
Table A1 summarizes parameter estimates of different 3SLS models as well as the 
system weighted r-square models. In addition, residual plots of model 1 to model 4 are 
provided. Model 1 is the initial 3SLS estimation with 293 observations. Model 2 is the 
second 3SLS estimation with 285 observations (8 outliers are removed). Model 3 is third 
3SLS estimation with 264 outliers (21 outliers are removed). Model 4 is the last and final 
3SLS estimation (2 outliers are removed). As evident in Table A1, every step I remove 
outliers, there is an improvement in the system weighted R-square as well as the 
parameter estimates. As shown in the plots, after removing the outliers, the residuals’ 
normality improves.  
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Table A1. Comparison of 3SLS Estimates 
  CEO 
activism 
CEO 
political 
ideology 
CEO 
activism 
´ CEO 
political 
ideology 
CEO 
activism 
CEO 
political 
ideology 
CEO 
activism 
´ CEO 
political 
ideology 
CSR CPA System 
weighted 
R-square 
  DV: CSR DV: CPA DV: Sales Growth  
Model 1 N = 293 0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.80) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.21*** 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.38) 
0.14* 
(0.04) 
-0.43 
(9.74) 
-2.48 
(14.88) 
0.117 
Model 2 N = 285 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.60) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.02)  
-0.07 
(0.41) 
0.18 
(0.04) 
3.42* 
(6.63) 
-2.24** 
(6.88) 
0.138 
Model 3 N = 264 0.00 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.54) 
0.11 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.40) 
0.20* 
(0.04) 
3.15* 
(7.32) 
-2.85** 
(9.31) 
0.141 
Model 4 N = 262 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
0.70 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.40) 
0.25* 
(0.04) 
3.62** 
(7.90) 
- 3.08** 
(9.53) 
0.134 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* indicates p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
** indicates p < 0.01, two-tailed. 
*** indicates p < 0.001, two-tailed. 
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CSR Residuals 
Figure A3. CSR Residual Histogram of Model 1 
 
Figure A4. CSR Residual Histogram of Model 4 
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Figure A5. Normal Q-Q Plot of CSR Residual Before Removing Outliers 
 
 
 
Figure A6. Normal Q-Q Plot of CSR Residual After Removing Outliers 
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CPA Residuals 
Figure A7. CPA Residual Histogram of Model 1 
 
Figure A8. Residual Histogram of Model 4 
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Figure A9. Normal Q-Q Plot of CPA Residual Before Removing Outliers 
 
Figure A10. Normal Q-Q Plot of CPA Residual After Removing Outliers 
 
 
 
 157 
Sales Growth 
Figure A11. Sales Growth Residual Histogram of Model 1 
 
 
Figure A12. Sales Growth Residual Histogram of Model 4 
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Figure A13. Normal Q-Q Plot of Sales Growth Residual Before Removing Outliers 
 
Figure A14. Normal Q-Q Plot of Sales Growth Residual After Removing Outliers 
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